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I Abstract 
The increased activities within the mergers and acquisitions market in recent times has 
highlighted the importance of Commissions, whose responsibility it is to protect 
competition in the common market place. An area of disagreement which often arises 
between merging parties and authorities - at the expense of time and money - is the 
definition of a relevant market within which to measure competition. This proposal seeks, 
with the aid of a recent case (Unilever vs. Competition Commission of South Africa), to 
identify why relevant markets are so incoherently drawn and whether guidelines mutually 
agreed upon between the merging parties and the Commission could aid in reaching a 
timely and cost effective resolution. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The globalisation of business in the last 50 years has seen a sharp increase in the 
levels of international mergers and acquisitions. Merging with or acquiring another 
company, often a competitor has the potential to dramatically strengthen a company' s 
market position and open new opportunities for competitive advantage. The merged 
company may acquire stronger technical skills, a wider lineup of products and wider 
geographic coverage. 
With this increased activity has come the need to protect consumer' s welfare by 
maintaining a high degree of competition in the common market. Competition should 
lead to lower prices, a wider choice of goods, and technological innovation, all in the 
interest of the consumer. Thus whenever required to consider a merger, the authorities 
must as a first step determine whether or not the merger is likely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition by assessing competition in the relevant market. 
A case that has recently brought to light the issue of relevant markets is the 
UnileverlRobertsons merger. 
On 16th. August 2000 the European Commission received a notification of a proposed 
merger by which Unilever PLC and Unilever N. V. ('Unilever") acquire control of the 
whole of Best foods. 
Unilever is incorporated both in the Netherlands and in the UK. Its principal 
businesses are in the foods, home care and professional cleaning and personal care 
categories. Unilever's food businesses are mainly oil and dairy based foods, ice cream 
and beverages, soups, sauces, food oils and frozen foods. Turnover totaled 40,979 
million Euros in 1999. 
Bestfoods is a publicly listed United States corporation. Bestfoods has extensive 
operations and various manufacturing facilities in Europe in the businesses of savoury 
products, mayonnaise and other dressings, bread spreads and desserts. Many of these 
are marketed under the Knorr brand. Bestfoods worldwide turnover in 1999 was 8 102 , 
million Euros. 
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1.1.1 UnileverlRobertsons 
The transaction was relevant to South Africa insofar as a South African company, 
Robertsons Holdings (pty) Limited (Robertsons), which is part of the Remgro group 
of companies, is, together with a Bestfoods' subsidiary, Bestfoods Europe Group 
Limited (Bestfoods Europe), involved in a joint venture company called Bestfoods 
Robertsons Holdings Limited LLC. The United States registered joint venture 
company has two subsidiaries in South Africa, namely Robertsons Foods (Pty) 
Limited and Robertsons Food Service (Pty) Limited. In terms of the joint venture 
agreement, Bestfoods licenses its products to Robertsons Foods to manufacture, 
distribute, market and sell in South Africa. Bestfoods licenses know-how and 
technology to Robertsons Foods and does not import products into South Africa. 
The parties to this transaction agreed to form a new joint venture company in South 
Africa combining the food business ofUnilever SA and those of the Bestfoods and 
Robertsons joint venture company. The new joint venture company, to be called 
Unilever Bestfoods Robertsons, would include Unifoods and Hudson & Knight from 
Unilever SA, and Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd and Robertsons Food Service (Pty) 
Limited from Robertsons' Holdings. Unilever plc would have management control of 
Unilever Bestfoods Robertsons. 
The parties activities both locally and abroad overlap in two different sectors: in the 
production and sale of food products dedicated to the retail sector and in the 
production and sale of food products dedicated to the catering sector (food service 
sector). The food service sector is identified as the supply of foods to hotels, 
restaurants, fast food outlets and institutional catering (factory and office canteens, 
hospitals, schools, etc.) Both the EU Commission and the South African Commission 
have identified these two different sectors as giving rise to separate product markets 
for food retailing and food service. For the purpose of this study attention will be 
focused on the food-retailing sector. 
As mentioned previously basic merger analysis is concerned with mergers that enable 
firms to increase their market power and raise prices above the competitive level. A 
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merger is considered illegal if it "substantially decreases competition or tends to 
create a monopoly". 
The first two steps of merger analysis are: 
Determining the relevant market. 
Measure market concentration by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
In the case of the UnileverlRobertsons merger the Competition Commission disagreed 
on the merging parties definition of the relevant product markets for the purposes of 
the transaction. The merging parties recognised 4 broad relevant markets for the 





The Commission for Competition adopted the parties international counterparts 
market definition which was to use the product classifications adopted by A. C. 
Nielsen, a firm that collects product data in the European food sector. In the 
worldwide merger consensus was reached between merging parties and the European 
Commission. The product market classifications were considered realistic and well 
defined in the context of markets within the EU- and were generally recognised as 
separate product groups or markets by most companies and trade customers in the 
business and by market research organisations covering the sector. In total 18 relevant 
product markets were identified: 
I.Ambient wet soups. 
2. Regular dry soups. 
3 Instant dry soups. 
4. Pot Snacks 
5. Dry side dishes 
6. Mayonnaise 
7. Salad Dressings 
8. Ketchup 
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9. Mustard 
10. Other Cold Sauces 
11. Hot dry sauces 
12 . Wet pasta sauces 
13. Other hot wet sauces 
14. Seed oils 
15 . Olive oils 
16. Bouillon 
17. Herbs, spices and seasoning 
18. Jams 
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The Competition Commission in South Africa found overlaps between the merging 
parties products in 10 (ten) markets. The Commission argued '<the high market shares 
and concentration levels resulting from the merger are likely to lead to a lessening in 
competition in the identified markets" (www.comptrib.co.za) . 
RELEVANT UNIFOODS ROBERTSONS MARKET 
Products Market Products Market Post 
share share Mer~er 
Packet soup Royco Soup 29,4% Knorr Soup 48,1% 77,5% 
Soya mince Royco 1,7% Knorr soya mince 31 ,3% 33,0% 
Vitamince and Knorr 
nyamanyama 
Sishebo mixes Royco Shebo-o- 11,6% Robertsons 83,8 % 95,4% 
mIX Jikelele stew mix 
Salad Dressing Royco Salad 14,4% Knorr Salad 55,4% 69,8% 
Dressing Dressing 





Dry marinades Royco Instant 35,3% Knorr Marinades and 64,5% 99,8% 
Marinade Meat Mate Marinade 
Pour-over- Royco 47,8% Knorr stir & Serve 34,4% 82,2% 
sauces Royco sauce Knorr sauce 
sensations combinations 





Products Market Products Market Post 
share share Merger 
Dry pasta Royco instant 49,3% Knorr instant sauce 32,7% 82,0% 
sauces pasta sauce and 
Knorr pastamia 
Instant soups Royco cup-a- 67,4% Knorr quick soup 21 ,4% 88,8% 
soup and and 
Royco cup-a- Knorr Oodles of 
snack Noodles 
Black Spreads Oxo spread 10,0% Marmite and Bovril 89,5% 99,5% 
Table 1.1: UnifoodslRobertsons Product Market Sbare 
Source - Competition Tribunal South Africa 
Case Number 55ILM/Sep01 
Whilst these large inconsistencies in the relevant markets were not responsible for the 
outright prohibition of the merger, they were key in establishing that the product 
portfolio currently marketed under the Royco and Oxo brands would require 
divestiture to a viable third party approved by the Commission. 
1.2 Motivation 
UnileverlRobertsons primary objective is to maximise shareholders wealth through 
profits, growth and market share. When merging, their aim is to avoid where possible 
the divestiture of profitable businesses to a third party. 
The Commission for Competition's objective is to protect the consumer. It does so by 
analysing the respective market and ensuring that healthy competition is maintained 
within these parameters, often legislating divestiture of portions of a business in order 
to maintain competition. 
Two parties protecting their own interests and responsibilities makes for an intriguing 
analysis relevant in today's business environment. 
1.3 Value 
Agreement on how to define the relevant market is a real business problem faced by 
companies and authorities worldwide. (Examples include FTC v Coca-Cola Co and 
FTC v Office Depot, Inc). 
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A great deal of time and money is spent by both parties in protecting their interests 
and lobbying their points of views in hearings and appeals. If it can be determined that 
initial guidelines between parties and authority to define relevant markets would have 
benefited the UnileverlRobertson case, there may be an argument for such an 
implementation on a wider scale. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
"Why do merging parties and authorities define relevant markets differently?" 
In the case of the UnileverlRobertsons merger, the merging parties claim that the 
AC.Nielsen product classification (the one used by the parties in their submission to 
the European Commission) should be rejected for the purposes of the South African 
case. They argue "factors specific to South Africa justify a departure from the Nielsen 
categories .. (www.comptrib.co.za). 
They also criticise the AC.Nielsen product classification as being oflimited use in 
defining the relevant market for competition purposes. They argue that the priority in 
the A C.Nielsen Product Definitions is the practical collection of data on products and 
not the measurement of substitutability between different products; and no consumer 
demand-led research is conducted in the compilation of data. As a result, the 
A C.Nielsen Product Definitions are too narrow for competition law purposes and 
products that compete with each other end up being classified under different classes. 
The Commission for Competition's Market Definition - "The Commission disagrees 
with the parties (UnileverlRobertsons) market definition. In the Commission's 
opinion, the merging parties have defined the market too widely. In its report the 
Commission criticises the various reports and studies relied upon by the merging 
parties for their market definition. The Commission seeks to demonstrate that the said 
reports and studies do not support the market definitions proposed by the parties. It 
points out perceived inconsistencies and omissions amongst the documents filed by 
the parties in support of their market definition. The efficiencies that the merging 
parties claim will result from the merger are also disputed by the Commission. In 
addition, the Commission casts doubts upon the objectivity ofthe studies and the 
reports" (www.comptrib.co.za) . 
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A wider market definition as suggested be used by the merging parties, would have 
resulted in lower market shares for the parties in some areas where overlap occurs 
because of the larger group of products within that market. Potential threats to 
competition were more likely to be removed under those conditions thus benefiting 
the merging parties. 
In its briefing paper no.3 the Competition Tribunal of SA states "defining the relevant 
market means drawing the market edges so that it contains all the closely substitutable 
goods and excludes all goods not substitutable in a specific geographic area. Market 
definition is divided into two dimensions namely product type and geographic area". 
Two important points have to be made regarding market definition: 
Market definition is not an end in itself; it is an analytical tool that assists in 
determining the competitive constraints upon undertakings. 
Market definition enables the competitive constraints only from actual competitors be 
identified, it tells us nothing of potential competitors. 
The European Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market published 
9
th 
December 1997 is useful in determining some of the techniques that may be 
deployed when defining a market. The Notice identifies demand substitutability as the 
essence of market definition. 
Paragraph 14 of the Notice states that the assessment of demand substitution entails a 
determination of the range of products that are viewed as substitutes by the consumer. 
This can be quantified using cross elasticity of demand. 
CE of demand = % change in quantity of X demanded 
% change in the price of Y 
Table 1.2: Cross Elasticity of Demand 
A positive CE of demand means that the 2 goods are substitutes and a negative CE 
that they are compliments. Whilst the concept of CE is logical it is difficult to 
measure accurately. 
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The "SSNIP" test has been deployed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) when analyzing horizontal mergers. Richard Whish 
(1999) identifies the test as follows "suppose that a producer of a product, for 
example a widget - were to include a Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in 
Price. In those circumstances would consumers be inclined to switch their purchases 
to other makes ofwidgets or even blodgets? If the answer is yes, this would suggest 
that the market is at least as wide as widgets generally and includes blodgets as well". 
When determining whether firms have market power, it is necessary for the relevant 
geographic market to be defined. While some products can be supplied without 
difficulty throughout the world, there could be other reasons why a product can only 
be supplied within a certain area. The identification of the geographic market helps 
identify which other firms impose a competitive constraint on those under 
investigation. 
Market concentration refers to the extent to which one, or a small number of firms 
dominate economic activity in a particular market. Concentration is regarded as one 
of the most important indicators of competitiveness in an industry. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index better known as the lUll index is a statistical measure of 
concentration. 
The lUll accounts for the numbers of firms in a market, as well as concentration, by 
incorporating the relative size (that is market share) of all firms in a market. It is 
calculated by squaring the market shares of all firms in a market and then summing 





(Msi? where MS represents the market share of firm I and there 
are n firms in the market. The lUll gives much heavier 
weight to firms with large market shares than to firms with small shares as a result of 
squaring the market shares. This feature of the lUll corresponds to the theoretical 
notion in economics that the greater the concentration of output in a small number of 
firms, the greater the likelihood that, other things being equal, competition in a market 
will be weak. 
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Supply side effects such as new entrants to market, barriers to entry, technical barriers 
and cost of branding have all been identified as additional factors that determine the 
outcomes of mergers and acquisition. 
• Barriers to entry - ease of market entry. 
• Technical barriers - what equip is needed to enter the market. 
• Branding - in the fast moving consumer goods market (FMCG) market, 
market participants estimate that between R30 million - RI 00 million is 
required to create a meaningful brand. 
However this study will be limited to defining market share and market concentration. 
Whilst every case the Competition Commission oversees is unique, the European 
Commission's notice suggests the following evidence may be used in defining the 
relevant product market: 
1. Evidence of substitution in the recent past - what has been customers' 
response to a forced substitution in the past. 
2. Quantitative Tests including Own Price Elasticities and Cross Price 
Elasticities. 
3. View of customers and competitors- the Commission will contact customers 
and competitors in a case that involves market definition, and will where 
appropriate ask them to answer the SSNIP test. 
4. Marketing studies and consumer surveys - the Commission will look at 
marketing studies as a useful provider of information about the market. It will 
scrutinise the methodology followed in a consumer survey in order to ensure 
that selection of questions were not deliberately made to achieve a favourable 
outcome. 
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1.5 Objectives of the study 
1. To determine whether guidelines could have been set by the Competition 
Commission of South Africa and the merging parties (Unilever and 
Robertsons), prior to the attempt of defining relevant markets. 
2. Would the guidelines have assisted in better defining the relevant market? 
3. Had both parties used these guidelines could time and money have been saved 
in reaching an agreement? 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The dissertation will follow a qualitative approach focusing on the case study analysis 
of '1.1nilever" vs. The Competition Commission of South Africa. The Competition 
Tribunal ' s decision in allowing the merger to go ahead provided certain interests be 
divested (Royco and Oxo) will also be examined. 
1. 7 Limitations 
A wealth of information regarding this case - including reports and studies presented 
by the merging parties - has been documented in the archives of the Competition 
Tribunal of South Africa (Pretoria) and is open to the general public. However, there 
is information (not specifically defined) that is confidential to the merging parties and 
the Competition Commission; and may not be disclosed to any third party. 
1.8 Structure of the study 
The study will be structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 - will provide a theoretical background on competition, defining a relevant 
market, and calculation of market concentration using the HIll index. 
Chapter 3 - is a study of the UnileverlRobertson case, whereby the merging parties 
and the Competition Commission define relevant markets differently. It includes the 
Competition Tribunal' s views and the case's final outcome. 
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Chapter 4 - is an analysis of the data relating both to defining relevant markets and 
market concentration. Interesting patterns relating to the outcome of the case are 
highlighted. 
Chapter 5 - summarises why merging parties and authorities define relevant markets 
differently. It establishes what can be done to further empower the authorities; and at 
the same time provide the private sector with the certainty it desires. 
1.9 Summary 
This practical real life example epitomizes the different views merging parties and 
authorities have on defining a relevant market. The case assists us in understanding 
why this is so and engages us in thought of how, if at all, the system can be improved. 
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CHAPTER 2: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions are a means of corporate expansion and growth. They are 
not the only means of corporate growth, but are an alternative to growth by internal 
and organic capital investment. The terms "merger", "acquisition" and "takeover" are 
all part of the mergers and acquisitions parlance. In a merger, the corporations come 
together to combine and share their resources to achieve common objectives. The 
shareholders of the combining firms often remain as joint owners of the combined 
entity. An acquisition resembles more of an arms-length deal with one firm 
purchasing the assets or shares of another, and with the acquired firm's shareholders 
ceasing to be owners of that firm. In a merger a new entity may be formed subsuming 
the merging firms, whereas in an acquisition the acquired firm becomes the subsidiary 
of the acquirer. 
A "takeover" is similar to an acquisition and also implies that the acquirer is much 
larger than the acquired. Where the acquired firm is much larger than the acquirer, the 
acquisition is referred to as a "reverse takeover" . 
The immediate objective of an acquisition is self-evidently growth and expansion of 
the acquirer's assets, sales and market share. However this merely represents an 
intermediate objective. A more fundamental objective may be the enhancement of 
shareholders wealth through acquisitions aimed at accessing or creating sustainable 
competitive advantage for the acquirer. 
Mergers and acquisitions focus on the well being of shareholders (through wealth 
maximisation) and the immediate effect on employees due to the merger. However, 
there are wider constituencies than simply these two groups. One of these parties is 
the consumer. What effect will a merger have on competition? 
2.2 Why do Companies Merge? 
Whilst these are generic reasons for mergers and takeovers they clearly summarise the 
reasons behind corporates merging. 
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2.2.1 Sources of Gains in M&A's 
A. Strategy 
1. Develop a new strategic vision 
2. Achieve long-run strategic goals 
3. Acquire new capabilities in industry 
4. Obtain talent for fast-moving industry 
5. Add capabilities to expand role in a technologically advancing industry. 
6. Quickly move into new products, markets 
7. Apply a broad range of capabilities and managerial skills in new areas. 
B. Economies of scale 
1. Cut production costs due to large volume 
2. Combine R&D operations 
3. Increased R&D at controlled risk 
4. Increased sales force 
5. Cut overhead costs 
6. Strengthen distributions systems 
C. Economies of scope 
1. Broaden product line 
2. Provide one-stop shopping for all services 
3. Obtain complementary products 
D. Extend advantages in differentiated products 
E. Advantages of size 
1. Large size can afford high-tech equipment 
2. Spread the investment in the use of expensive equipment over more units. 
3. Ability to get equal discounts 
4. Better terms in deals 
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F. Best Practices 
1. Operating Efficiencies (improve management of receivables, inventories, fixed 
assets, etc). 
2. Faster tactical implementation 
3. Incentives for workers - rewards 
4. Better utilization of resources 
G. Market Expansion 
1. Increased market shares 
2. Obtain access to new markets 
H. New Capabilities, managerial skills 
1. Apply a broad range of capabilities and managerial skills in new areas. 
2. Acquire capabilities in new industry. 
3. Obtain talent for fast-moving industries. 
I. Competition 
1. Achieve critical mass early before rivals 
2. Preempt acquisitions by competitors 
3. Compete on EBIT growth for high valuations 
J. Customers 
1. Develop new key customer relationships 
2. Combined company can meet customers demand for a wide range of services. 
K Technology 
1. Exploit one another's technological advantage 
2. Add new R&D capabilities 
3. Add new key patent technology 
4. Acquire technology for lagging areas. 
L. Adjust to industry consolidation activities 
1. Eliminate industry excess capacity 
2. Need to cut costs 
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N. Shift in product strategy 
1. Shift from overcapacity area to area with more favourable sales capacity. 
2. Exit a product area that has become commoditised to area of speciality. 
P. Globalisation 
1. International competition - to establish presence in foreign markets and to 
strengthen position in domestic market. 
2. Size and economies of scale required for effective global competition 
3. Growth opportunities outside domestic market 
4. Diversification 
a. Product Line 
b. Geographically - enlarge market 
c. Reduce systematic risk 
d. Reduce dependence on exports 
5. Improve distribution in other countries 
6. Political/economic stability 
a. Circumvent protective tariffs 
b. Political/economic stability 
c. Government policy 
d. Invest in a safe, predictable environment 
e. Take advantage of common markets 
7. Relative exchange rate condition 
Table 2.1: Sources of Gains in M&A's 
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Source: Weston JF & Weaver SC (2001) 
2.3 The Significance Of Competition 
1. Competition serves the consumer - it operates regularly to protect him against 
extortion. If the quality of the product offered by one producer is low, the quality 
of that offered by another may be high. If the price charged by one producer is 
high, that asked by another may be low. The consumer is not at the mercy of the 
one as long as he has the alternative of buying from another. 
2. "Competition operates affirmatively to enhance quality and reduce price" (Wilcox 
1970). The producer who wishes to enhance his profits must increase his sales. To 
do so he must offer the consumer more goods for less money. As he adds quality 
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and subtracts from price, his rivals are compelled to do the same. The changes that 
he initiates soon spread throughout the trade. Every consumer of its products gets 
more and pays less. 
3. Competition is conducive to the continuous improvement of industrial efficiency. 
"It leads some produces to eliminate waste and cut costs so that they may 
undersell others. It compels others to adopt similar measures in order that they 
may survive. It weeds out those whose costs are high and thus operates to 
concentrate production in the hands of those whose costs are low" (Wilcox 1970). 
4. Competition makes for material progress. It facilitates the introduction of new 
products. It speeds up innovation and communicates to all producers the 
improvements made by one of them. Competition is cumulative in its effects. 
When competitors cut their prices, consumers buy more goods, output decreases 
and unit costs decline. The lower prices compel producers to seek still further 
means of cutting costs. The resulting gain is efficiency and the increasing pushing 
to the boundary of technology to open the way for still lower prices. 
5. Merger is the most obvious route to dominance, and merger policy is the most 
systematic branch of policy against its acquisition. The merger however, should 
be subject to investigation if it appears that it may jeapordise competition. If it is 
found not to threaten competition, it should be allowed. In short, competition 
should be the prime consideration when determining whether a merger should 
progress or not. 
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Prima facie, does the merger possibly 
dimini sh competition? 
Yes 
After investigating the facts, does it 
appear that the merger jeopardizes 
competition? 
Yes 
Is it proven that other benefits flowing 
from the merger offset the 
disadvantage of diminished 
competition? 
No 






Permit the merger 
Figure 2.1: Flowchart for Disallowing/Permitting a Merger 
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Source: Modern Competitive Analysis (Oster, 1990) 
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2.4 Perfect Competition 
2.4.1 Introduction 
"A market in which no buyer or seller has market power" (Schiller; 2000). 
" ... all goods and services have a price and are traded on markets" and that " ... no 
firm or consumer is large enough to affect the market price" (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus; 1998). 
2.4.2 Number and Size of Firms 
Within the market structure of Perfect Competition, firms sell a standardised product 
with no ability to influence the industry price and the consequence of this is that there 
are normally a large number of small firms that make up this market. Each firm has 
only a very small percentage of the market and can thus only sell their product at the 
current market rate. The firms that make up this market are small by nature in 
relation to the size of the overall market. 
2.4.2.1 Cost and Demand Conditions 
Due to the nature of the Perfect Competition market, no firm has the ability to 
influence the price of the product being sold and thus needs to match carefully the 
demand for the product with the ability to sell the product and the cost of producing 
that product. In perfect competition, no matter what the volume of the product being 
produced, it can only be sold at the current market rate. According to Schiller (2000: 
459), "the equilibrium price is established by the intersection of market demand and 
market supply". ' 'The demand curve as faced by the perfectly competitive firm is 
horizontal or perfectly elastic" (Brook; 2001). 
The cost of the product is the total cost divided by the output and as long as the 
average revenue earned exceeds the average costs of the product then the firm is 
earning a profit and can remain in business. 
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2.4.2.2 Nature of Products 
The perfectly competitive industry produces a homogenous or standardized product 
that means that the consumer cannot differentiate between products produced by 
different firms . The products have identical features and consumers are willing to pay 
the market price for the product produced by any firm. 
2.4.2.3 Conditions of Entry 
The perfectly competitive market is characterised by no barriers to entry and to exit. 
As long as profits are being made, firms will enter the market to maximise profits but 
by doing so, they will drive down the price of the product and this will result in either 
a breakeven scenario or a loss scenario at which time, they will exit the market. The 
mentioned scenarios are according to Schiller (2000), reached "if the losses from 
continuing production exceed fixed costs" . The only manner in which to survive this 
type of competition, is to lower the average cost curve thus producing the product at a 
lower cost than the competition is able to and this can be achieved by the use of 
technology. 
2.4.2.4 Degree of Regulation 
There is almost no direct regulation in the perfectly competitive market and only the 
forces of supply and demand regulate the market. 
2.4.3 Decisions about Pricing and Output 
Regardless of how much output is produced by a firm, the market price of the product 
being sold remains at the current market price. The consequence of this is that the 
decision on pricing is left to the market to decide. The firm does however have to 
make the decision on how much output to produce and this decision is driven by the 
rule of profit maximisation which according to Schiller (2000), states ''Never produce 
a unit of output that costs more than it brings in" . To arrive at the correct decision, 
the firm will have to determine its production levels and how an increase in 
production will affect the costs as well as the revenues. To do this the firm will have 
to look at the marginal revenue which is the "change in total revenue that occurs when 
output is increased by 1 unit to calculate marginal revenue, the total revenues received 
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before and after a I-unit increase in the rate of production are compared. The 
difference between the two totals equals the marginal revenue" (Schiller, 2000). 
As firms within the perfectly competitive market are price takers, they will maximise 
their profits in the short-run but as more firms enter the market, the price will be 
driven down and they will over the long-run reach a breakeven or loss scenario. 
Unless they have the technology to drive down their average cost curve, they will 
have to exit the market and this is primarily due to the fact that they have no ability to 
influence the market price at any given time as they can only sell their product for the 
current market price. 
2.4.3.1 Investment 
As this is a long-tenn decision made well in advance, the decision made could in the 
end result in misfortune or bad luck but the decision also involves the short-term 
decision of investing in, or exiting a market and is thus one that would be carefully 
considered. If the costs of operating a plant or remaining in a market exceed the 
average revenues, then the firm will have to make this decision based on the 
economic realities that prevail in the market at the time. The decision could, 
however, involve making a plant idle or closing it down completely. Similarly, if the 
price and demand for a product is on the increase, the decision could be about 
investing in the market, i.e. building, buying or leasing a new plant to satisfy market 
demand. 
Within the perfect competition market, the decision made will centre on the ability of 
the firm to increase production at the lowest average cost per unit of production and in 
so doing remain profitable. The long-tenn investment decision is thus dependent on 
the short-tenn production ability of the firm to make the best possible use of the fixed 
inputs that occur. 
2.4.3.2 Marketing and Product Design 
In the perfect competition market, the consumer cannot differentiate one firm ' s 
product from another firm's as the products produced are homogenous or standardised 
and the role therefore of marketing is minimal. Due to the maximisation of profits 
that characterise a perfectly competitive market, no large amount can be used to fund 
Why Do Merging Parties and Authorities Define Relevant Markets Differently? 
Page 21 
an advertising campaign that would add to the Total Average Costs of the units 
produced. 
2.4.4 Profitability 
The rules that govern profitability within a perfect competition market are according 
to Stacey Brook, (2001), as follows: 
If Price > Average Total Costs then the firm is making a profit. If the Average Total 
Cost curve is below the demand curve at any point then the firm is making a profit. 
If Price < Average Total Costs then firm is making a loss. If the Average Total Cost 
curve is above the demand curve at every point then the firm is making a loss 
If Price = Average Total Costs then firm is making zero profit. If the Average Total 
cost curve is resting on the demand curve then the firm is making zero profit 
To increase profit, the firm has to either lower the total average cost per unit or 
increase the price of the product. As increasing the price of the product is not 
possible within the perfectly competitive market, the only option is to reduce the 
average total cost per unit and this can be accomplished by the use of technology. 
2.4.4.1 Rate of Innovation 
As the products being produced are homogenous, the rate of innovation is low. If one 
firm produces a product where demand is acute, then others will follow by copying 
the product and entering the market. The rate of innovation therefore only applies to 
the first firm to produce the item and thereafter ceases to exist as more and more firms 
enter the market to make a profit by copying the product in demand. 
2.5 Monopolistic Competition 
2.5.1 Introduction 
"Monopolistic competition refers to a market structure that is a cross between the two 
extremes of perfect competition and monopoly. The model allows for the presence of 
increasing returns to scale in production and for differentiated (rather than 
homogeneous or identical) products" (www.internationalecon.com). 
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"A market in which many firms produce similar goods or services but each maintains 
some independent control of its own price" (Schiller; 2000). 
2.5.2 Number and Size of Firms 
In this market, there are many smaller firms with the possibility of free entry and exit 
in response to profit. These firms supply slightly different products from those 
supplied by a competitor. 
2.5.2.1 Cost and Demand Conditions 
In this market, if the price of one firm's product were to rise, some consumers would 
switch their purchase to another product from another firm within the same industry 
and would thus face a downward sloping demand curve for its product. The position 
of the demand curve would however depend upon the characteristics and the price of 
the product in relation to alternative and substitutable products produced by the 
competitor firms. (www.internationalecon.com). 
In the Monopolistic Competition market, there are also economies of scale to be 
found in the production of products. This means that there is a downward sloping 
average cost curve. The average costs fall when a firm increases its output, which 
means that the costs per unit falls with an increase in the scale of production that is 
similar to the situation found in a monopoly market 
2.5.2.2 Nature of Products 
According to Schiller (2000), product differentiation is: "features that make one 
product appear different from competing products in the same market". 
The outputs produced by firms within the monopolistic competition market are 
differentiated from one another and the consumer is aware of this differentiation. The 
demand curve is downward sloping due to this differentiation 
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2.5.2.3 Conditions of Entry 
In this market, there is free entry and exit of firms, driven by profits. As in the perfect 
competition market, if there are profits to be made, many firms will enter the market 
that will cause the price to fall and once the firms start making losses, they will drop 
out of the market. The long-run profits for firms in this market tend towards zero. 
2.5.2.4 Degree of Regulation 
As in the perfect competition market, there is not much regulation in the monopolistic 
market and the low barriers to entry that characterise this market help keep the 
industry regulated by the economics prevailing in the market at the time, i.e. the 
markets regulate themselves as any firm that increases its price too much will be 
punished as consumers move to alternative products. 
2.5.3 Decisions about Pricing and Output 
" ... production decision is similar to that of a monopolist. Both types of firms 
confront downward-sloping demand and marginal revenue curves. To maximise 
profits, both seek the rate of output at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost" 
(Schiller; 2000). 
As the firm's output is differentiated, there is some scope for increasing the price but 
as this market contains substitutable products, consumers will switch to alternative 
products within the same industry that are cheaper. There are also economies of scale 
to be found within production and by increasing production, the total average cost per 
unit can be reduced which means that each product is produced more efficiently and 
this reduction in cost is passed onto the consumer as profit is forced to zero for each 
firm (www.internationale.com). 
2.5.3.1 Investment 
As with the perfect competition market, the decision investment made will centre on 
the ability of the firm to increase production at the lowest average cost per unit of 
production and in so doing remain profitable. The long-term investment decision is 
thus dependent on the short-term production ability of the firm to make the best 
possible use of the fixed inputs that occur. 
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2.5.3.2 Marketing and Product Design 
Due to the competitive nature of the market with product differentiation being part of 
the characteristic of the market, marketing and product design forms one of the most 
important aspects of competing in this market. As the firms do not compete on price, 
they "engage in non-price competition of which advertising is the most prominent" 
(Schiller; 2000). 
To entice consumers to the firms product, firms spend heavily on advertising and this 
tends to lead to resource misallocation which causes the price of advertised goods to 
be more expensive to the consumer than those produced by smaller competing firms. 
The advertising does however install within the consumer a sense of awareness about 
the product and the hope is that the consumer will continue to use the product even if 
it is more expensive than the less advertised product. 






Advertising - this is used extensively by the firms to differentiate the product and 
is used to convince consumers that the product is worth the extra price 
Brand Names - the consumer becomes familiar with a particular product from a 
particular firms and continues to support that product 
Packaging - can be used to attract the consumer to the product 
Design changes - slight changes and improvements to a product could cause the 
consumer to switch to the newer version 
Services - besides the product, firms offer additional value-add to the product and 
this could include a guarantee or warranty on the product 
2.5.4 Allocative Efficiency 
In monopolistic competition, allocative efficiency is not achieved as consumers pay a 
higher-than-competitive-price and obtain a less-than-optimal-output. Simply put, 
consumers pay more than they should for a product and this is directly related to the 
misallocation of resources within this market caused by excessive advertising and 
brand building. 
Why Do Merging Parties and Authorities Define Relevant Markets Differently? 
Page 25 
2.5.4.1 Profitability 
Under monopolistic competition, firms have control over price of their product. In 
the short-run they can earn an economic profit however, over the long run, profits for 
this market are zero as new entry shifts the firm's demand downward and eliminates 
economic profit. The firms can however entice consumers to their product by 
adverting or by changing or modifying the product that will yield excess profits 
especially if the improvement to the product is significant. 
2.5.4.2 Rate of Innovation 
Under monopolistic competition firms have an incentive to develop new products, 
improve existing products and differentiate their products by adverting, packaging 
and design. The rate of innovation within this market is therefore quite high as each 
firm seeks to outdo the competition and make excessive profits by delivering to the 
market, a new or improved product. 
2.6 Monopoly 
2.6.1 What Is A Monopoly? 
An industry where there is a single supplier of a good or service that has no close 
substitutes and in which there is a barrier preventing new firms from entering is a 
monopoly. In practice the boundaries of an industry are arbitrary, and the 
determination of monopolies is a long and costly business for institutions such as the 
Competition Commission. 








Legal barriers e.g. law, licence or patent restrictions 
Natural monopoly e.g. a unique source of supply of a raw material or economies 
of scale 
Economies of scale 
Production differentiation and brand loyalty 
Ownership of wholesale and retail outlets 
Mergers and takeovers 
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• Aggressive tactics and intimidation 
2.6.2 Demand and Revenue in Monopoly 
Since in a monopoly there is only one firm, the demand curve facing the firm is the 
demand curve facing the industry. The demand curve is the average revenue curve 
and a downward sloping average revenue curve will also mean the firm facing a 
downward sloping marginal revenue curve. This is shown in the diagram below. 
Price 
MR decreas e at 
twice 1h e r ate of AA 
AR 
Quantity' 
Figure 2.2: Average RevenuelMarginal Revenue Relationship 
Source: www.bized.ac.uk 
It is important to notice that the marginal revenue curve is below the demand curve 
(average revenue). Why is marginal revenue less than price? Because when the price 
is lowered to sell one more unit, there are two opposite effects on revenue. The lower 
price results in a revenue loss but the increased quantity results in a revenue gain. 
When marginal revenue is positive total revenue is increasing. When marginal 
revenue is negative total revenue is declining. When marginal revenue is zero total 
revenue is at a maximum. 
2.6.2.1 Revenue and Elasticity 
We have already established a connection between elasticity of demand and the effect 
of a change in price on total revenue. If demand is elastic total revenue increases 
when the price falls . If demand is inelastic, total revenue decreases when price falls . 
The output range over which total revenue increases when price decreases is the same 
as that over marginal revenue is positive. Thus the output range over which MR is 
positive is also the output range over which demand is elastic. 
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2.6.3 Equilibrium Price and Output 
Although the monopolist is a price maker and can choose which price to charge, it is 
still constrained by the demand curve. A monopolist (like a perfectly competitive 
firm) will maximize profits where MR = MC. The supernormal / economic profit is 
shown in the diagram below. 
Pri;e 
S uperoo rrral 
Profit 
Q uantity 
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Price and Output 
Source: www.bized.ac.uk 
The supernormal profit per unit is the difference between the average revenue and 
average cost. To get the total supernormal profit you then multiply by the output 
produced. This amount is equivalent to the area in the above diagram. 
2.6.4 Monopolists and Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination is the practice of charging some customers a higher price than 
others for an identical good. Price discrimination increases a monopolist's profits by 
increasing its revenue. Three conditions are necessary. 
1. The firm must be a price setter. 
2. Markets must be separate, with no leakages. That is consumers in the low price 
market must be able to resell the good or service in the higher priced market. 
3. Demand elasticity must differ in each market. The firm will charge a higher price 
in the market where demand is less elastic, and thus less price sensitive. 
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2.6.5 Comparing Monopoly and Competition 
• Monopoly charges a higher price and produces a lower quantity than under 
competition 
• Monopoly prevents some of the gains from trade so is less efficient than 
competition 
• Monopoly reallocates surplus from the consumer to the producer 
• Monopoly may be more efficient than competition where economies of scale or 
scope are available 
Competition policy creates a healthy business environment that is conducive to 
competitiveness and economic growth. 
2.7 The Guidelines of Foreign Competitive Authorities 
In the interest of transparency and predictability especially where statutes are silent 
and ambiguous on the subject, foreign competitive authorities issue guidelines on the 
mechanisms they employ to identify the market in which alleged anticompetitive 
actions and transactions are taking place. They all accept that such relevant markets 
consist of at least a product and a geographic component. 
Although there are discernible differences between them, all the guidelines accept that 
the relevant product market is delineated by determining the likely buyer response to 
a "small but significant and non transitory" price increase (usually in the range of 5-
10%) imposed by a hypothetical monopolist. If in response to a price increase, buyers 
would switch to products outside the initially identified market in sufficient numbers 
to discourage the hypothetical monopolist from raising prices, the initially identified 
market would have been drawn too narrowly and must be extended to include other 
products that can be regarded as acceptable substitutes for the initially identified 
product. 
A similar process is used to identify the relevant geographic market, except that in 
this case the object of the exercise is to "demarcate the area within which the buyers 
would be prepared to seek alternative sources of supply of the product whose price 
has been increased by a small but significant amount by the hypothetical monopolist" 
(Greenhut; 1987). 
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The concept of elasticity of demand is of crucial significance in this process. It can be 
defined as "the ratio of the percentage change in price that induced the quality change. 
A high elasticity of demand for a product or group of products indicates that good 
substitutes exist. It is accordingly unlikely that the initially identified product market 
would be the correct market for the purposes of competition law analysis" (Greenhut; 
1987). 
On the other hand, a low elasticity of demand would indicate that the substitutes 
under consideration are inappropriate, with the result that the initially identified 
product market could be accepted as the relevant market. 
2.7.1 United States Competition Law 
In defining the relevant product market, courts in the United States have traditionally 
taken two factors into account: 
The first of these is the extent to which the defendant's product is "interchangeable" 
in use with possible alternative products as argued in Bacchis Industries Inc vs. Arvin 
Industries Inc (Werden, 1998). 
The second is the cross-elasticity of demand test between the defendant's product and 
supposed substitutes for it. The "interchangeability" test is relatively mechanical in its 
application. Determining cross-elasticity of demand between products is a much more 
abstract process which is based more on economics than law. As stated in Alien 
Myland Inc v International Business Machines Corp (Werden, 1998) "the key test for 
determining whether one product is a substitute for another is whether there is cross-
elasticity of demand between them, in other words, whether the demand for the 
second good would respond to changes in the price of the first" 
2.7.2 The European Commission Competition Law 
The EU competition policy is one of the means to pursue the overall objective of a 
unified common market between member states. Competition policy is thus 
complementary to policies that abolish institutional obstacles to trade between 
members such as tariffs and quotas. Its purpose is to ensure that private parties do not 
frustrate market integration by way of anti-competitive practices. Competition is seen 
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as being essential to securing the aims of the treaty of Rome (31) calling for the 
"institution of a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted''(http://europa. eu. int). 
The main provisions of the EU competition law are articles 85 + 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome. 
Article 85 prohibits and declares void agreements and concerted practices which have 
the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the EEC 
and which effect trade between member states. 
Article 86 of the Treaty is concerned with market dominance. It considers "any abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or a 
substantial part of it ... in so far as it may affect trade between member states, such 
abuse may in particular consist in: 
(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchasing or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions. 
(b) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of the 
consumers. 
(c ) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts" (http://europa.eu.int) . 
2.8 Market Definition and Market Shares 
Competition authorities attach great importance to market share figures in anti-trust 
proceedings involving market dominance. Perhaps the most famous statement of all 
about market shares is Judge Leaned Hands opinion in the Alcoa case in 1945 when 
he declared that a share of more than 90 percent is "enough to constitute a monopoly, 
it is doubtful whether 60 to 64 percent would be enough and 33 percent is not" 
(Werden, 1998). 
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Judgments relating market shares to market power make market definition of the 
essence. Thus Merkin and Williams (1988) in their recent text on competition law 
write "Generally, the more narrowly the market is defined, the easier it becomes to 
conclude that a firm has a dominant position ... However the possibility of dominance 
becomes increasingly remote as the market is widened. Obviously, structuralist 
economists are more willing to use narrow definition than those who are more 
confident in the robustness of the competition process" (Werden, 1998). 
On theoretical grounds the scope given to a market area will be different depending 
on whether the antitrust authorities adopt the "demand side" or the "demand and 
supply side approach". 
The European authorities are usually more concerned with the demand side approach. 
According to a notice adopted by the Commission in 1997: "A relevant product 
market compromises all those products and or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumers, by reasons of the products 
characteristics, their prices or intended uses" (http://europa.eu.int). 
The supply side substitution will only be taken into account in the market definition 
"if its effects are equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness 
and immediacy" (http://europa.eu.int). 
According to the demand side approach used by the European Commission, three 
questions have to be asked when defining the group of products comprised in a 
relevant market. 
The first concerns what Fischwick (1986) calls the "functional interchangeability" of 
the candidate product in the relevant market. The antitrust authority has to decide if a 
product A has the physical or technical properties enabling it to fulfill the same 
function as the product B supplied by the parties to the merger. In the case of a 
positive answer, the second question involves analysing their "reactive 
interchangeability". In the case of a modest price increase ofB, would the consumer 
react by buying product A? 
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The third question concerns the presence of barriers to substitution. A will not be 
considered as belonging to the same market as B if it is too difficult to transfer the 
purchases from B to (particularly if the buyer have to spend the same money on a new 
investment to use A or if this close substitute is not so well distributed as B, forcing 
the consumers to endure higher transport costs). 
The conventional measure of the degree of demand substitutability between 2 
products in their cross-elasticity of demand "The cross-elasticity of demand for 
product x with respect to the price of product Y is defined as the proportional change 
in the demand for X divided by the associated proportional change in the price ofY. It 
is well worth noting that t the price ofY may differ substantially from the cross-
elasticity ofY with respect to the price ofX" (Hay & Vickers, 1990). This makes it 
awkward to define markets in terms of cross-elasticity for it could happen that X is in 
the same market as Y but not vice versa. 
"Laboratory simulation being impossible in the economic field, the concrete 
application of this procedure proves to be all the more difficult since the regulatory 
authorities must very often make their decisions without always benefiting from 
sufficient information. Most often it is impossible to collect valuable data for a 
sufficient period oftime"(Hay & Vickers, 1990). One must however recognise that 
the high market shares of the parties calculated on such narrow markets have not, in 
all cases, led the Commission to consider the submitted merger as being incompatible 
with the Common Market. Very often the potential competition from firms located 
either within or outside the community has been taken into account in accepting the 
merger. 
2.9 The Marshallian Own Elasticity of Demand 
The concept of demand in modem economic theory owes much to Alfred Marshall 
and generally follows conventions he adopted in his 1890 Principles of Economics. A 
Marshallian demand curve indicates for a product or group of products, the quantity 
that will be purchased at each price, holding constant the prices of all other goods, 
nominal income and consumer tastes. 
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As the price of a product changes, there is said to be a movement along its demand 
curve or an increase ( decrease) in its quantity demanded. The effect on demand of 
changes in prices of other goods, nominal income or tastes is termed a shift in the 
demand curve or an increase ( or decrease) in demand. 
Marshall also introduced the Law of Demand that states that consumers will purchase 
less of a product the higher the price. In geographical terms this means both demand 
curves and inverse demand curves slope downward as one moves from left to right. 
Another ofMarshall ' s important contributions to the theory of demand was the 
concept of elasticity of demand, or more precisely, own price elasticity of demand. 
The elasticity of demand for a product indicates the responsiveness of its quantity 
demanded to a change in its price. Specifically, the own-price elasticity of demand for 
a product is the proportionate change in its quantity demanded divided by the 
proportionate change in price that induced the quantity change. 
Change in Quantity 
Quantity 
Change in Price 
Price 
Table 2.2: Price Elasticity of Demand 
Marshall ' s Law of Demand implies that a price change induces a quantity change that 
is opposite in sign, a price increase causes a quantity decrease and a price decrease 
causes a quantity increase. 
Elasticity of demand can be measured either at a single point, yielding a point 
elasticity or measured between two points yielding an arc elasticity. At a given point, 
demand is said to be elastic if its elasticity exceeds one, demand is said to be inelastic 
if elasticity is less than one, and demand is said to be unitary elastic if its elasticity is 
one exactly. Since elasticity of demand indicates how quantity changes relative to 
price, it also indicates how total revenue price multiplied by quantity sold changes on 
price changes. 
If demand is elastic, a price increase decreases revenue, if demand is inelastic a price 
increase increases revenue, and if demand is unitary elastic revenue is unaffected by a 
change in price. 
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The model of the monopoly is central to the notion of market power in economics. A 
monopolist is the supplier of a product with neither perfect nor even close substitutes. 
In the real world this means that substitutes are sufficiently distant that, as the 
monopolist changes price or quantity it reasonably ignores any feedback effects, i.e. 
effects on its demand curve caused by changes in the prices of other products in 
response to changes in its own price. A monopolist adjusts price or quantity to 
achieve maximum profit. Quantity will be decreased to the point at which any 
incremental decrease in output decreases revenue by just as much as it decreases 
costs. In economics terminology, profit is maximised at the point at which marginal 
revenue = marginal cost. 
' 'Denoting the elasticity of demand by E and the price by P, marginal revenue can be 
expressed as (I-lIE). Denoting marginal cost by c using (I-lIE) for marginal revenue, 
and rearranging terms yields" (Werden; 1998). 
p-c 1 
P E 
Table 2.3: Marginal Cost Equation 
Werden states that the competitive firm maximises profit just as the monopolist, but it 
faces a different demand curve. The competitive firm is a price taker, it can sell at the 
market price all it can produce, but it cannot affect that price by changing its output. 
Thus, the competitive firm faces an infinitely elastic demand curve throughout the 
relevant range - i.e. a demand curve that is a horizontal line. The marginal revenue for 
the competitive firm is just the market price. The condition for profit maximisation is 
that marginal revenue - price - equals marginal cost. 
The economic definition of market power means of course that the possession of 
market power is the rule rather than the exception; the majority of firms have at least a 
little market power. In particular, every seller of a product that is differentiated with 
respect to any relevant dimension almost certainly has some power. This includes, for 
example, the corner store that is spatially differentiated from rivals. Even if rivals are 
only a few blocks away, a small increase in price above the competitive level would 
not be likely to induce ALL customers to go elsewhere. 
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Although the concept of market power applies to firms other than monopolists, 
Marshall ' s analysis of demand did not. Marshall did not consider the demand curve 
faces by an individual firm with market power. In the early 1930's, Edward 
Chamberlain and Joan Robinson independently published papers concerning 
competition amongst sellers of differentiated products and they introduced the notion 
of the demand curve faced by the firm. 
Sellers of differentiated products are most commonly assumed by economists to 
engage in Bertrand's competition. Firms engaged in Bertrand competition choose 
prices non-co operatively to maximise their profits. 
The equilibrium with Bertrand competition is a set of prices such that each firm 
cannot, by changing its price increase its own profits, given its rivals prices. Because 
rivals prices are, in effect, held constant in the equilibrium concept, the condition for 
profit maximisation is again the same as that for a monopolist, again with demand 
elasticity being that for the firm. 
"Several things must be kept in mind when drawing inferences from estimated 
elasticity's. First, market power is proportional to the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
demand, so in market power term, the difference between elasticity's of 4 and 3 are 
roughly the same as the difference between demand elasticity's of 1.3 + 1.2. 
Secondly, theoretical analysis demonstrates that the elasticity cannot be less than 1 so 
an estimate elasticity of less than 2 must be considered rather low. 
Thirdly, estimates cannot prove the total absence of market power, since a firm still 
has some market power unless its demand elasticity is infinite and econometric 
methods can yield large, but not infinite estimates"(Werden; 1998) 
2.10 Cross Elasticity of Demand and the Ranking of Substitutes 
To this point, only own price elasticity of demand has been considered. Since the 
quantity demanded for one product may be affected by the prices of all other products 
it is possible to compute elasticity's with respect to the prices of each other's 
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products. The cross price elasticity of demand for product I with respect to the price 
of j is defined as: 
~/~ 
i1pi pi 
Table 2.4: Cross Elasticity of Demand 
If products are substitutes, an increase in the price of one increases the demand for the 
other, so that they have positive cross elasticity' s of demand. If products are 
complements, an increase in the price of one decreases the demand for the other so 
that they have a negative cross elasticity of demand. 
Since cross elasticity ' s of demand relate to the classes of substitutes it is only natural 
to think that cross elasticities of demand can play a useful role in market delineation. 
The first substantial effort to base market delineation on cross elasticities of demand 
appear to have been in economics texts of the early 50' s. The concept followed by 
creeping into case law through footnote 31 of Times-Picayine Publishing Co vs. 
United States: ' 'For every product substitutes exist . However, a relevant market 
cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The circle must be drawn 
narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable variables in price, 
only a limited number of buyers will turn, in technical terms, products whose cross 
elasticity's of demand are small" (Werden, 1998). 
In the famous Cellophane case of 1956 the court explained that "an element for 
consideration as to the cross-elasticities of demand between products is the 
responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes ofthe other. If a slight 
decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of customers of 
other flexible packaging materials to switch to cellophane, it would be an indication 
that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them, that the products compete 
in the same market" (Werden, 1998). 
Using cross-elasticities to delineate markets, the question posed is whether one given 
product is in the same market with another, and this question can obscure the ultimate 
issue. Asking whether one given product is in the same market with another imposes a 
question of symmetry - if A is in the market for B, B must be in the market for A, and 
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imposing this condition may greatly frustrate a market power analysis. Suppose that a 
small increase in the price of A induces some substitution to B, but so little total 
substitution to B and other products, that a hypothetical monopolist over A would 
raise prices significantly. Suppose also that a small increase in the price ofB would 
induce so much substitution to A and to other products that a hypothetical monopolist 
over B would not raise prices significantly. Under these circumstances, A is a market 
by itself but B is not. 
One method of ranking substitutes is according to the magnitude of "raw" cross 
elasticity'S of demand, for some base product the cross elasticity'S of demand for 
substitutes with respect to the price of the base product could be used to rank their 
closeness to the base product. It is doubtful however, that proportionate increases in 
quantities of substitutes demanded, as indicated by cross elasticity's of demand, are an 
appropriate measure of relative closeness. A substitute consumed in small quantities 
could experience a huge proportionate increase in its quantity demanded, even though 
that increase accounts for only a tiny portion of the total switching away from the 
base product. The least important substitute could have the highest cross elasticity of 
demand. 
Perhaps the most effective way to approach the issue is to define circumstances in 
which substitutes are equally close. One possible definition holds that ''two substitutes 
are equally close to a base product when they experience the same increase in unit 
sales in response to a small increase in the price of the base product" (Reynolds, 
1997). 
Two substitutes could also be considered equally close to a base product if, when the 
price of the base product is increased, the increase in unit or dollar sales of both 
substitutes is in proportion to their relative shares of units. This alternative definition 
relates to a property of consumer preferences termed by Economists - Independence 
ofIrrelevant Alternatives (HA), which implies that when the price of one product is 
increased, substitution to other products is proportion to their relative shares. 
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2.11 Description of the HID and its use 
Calculating on lllII is a straightforward process once percentage market shares are 
determined. "The market share of each participant in the market is squared and the 
resulting amounts are then totaled. Thus the lllII for a market consulting of3 firms 
with shares of(50%, 30% and 20% respectively) is the sum of502, 302 and 202 or 
2500+900+800=3800" (Laine; 1995). 
Several important properties of the lllII are readily apparent. First the lllII is highly 
responsive to asymmetry to market share. "For any given number of participants in a 
market, the lllII will be lowest when market shares are equal, the highest when one 
firm has an extremely large share of the market" (Rhoades, 1996). 
The using a numerical illustration, a market consisting of 3 firms with equal shares 
has an a lllII of3333 (33 .32)*3=3333, but a 3 firm market in which one firm has a 
99% share would have an lllII of more than 9800 (992 =9801). This sensitivity to 
asymmetry is one of the principal claimed advantages of the HHI. However it is the 
same sensitivity to asymmetry that caries with it a serious drawback: small errors in 
estimating the leading firms market shares can produce large differences in HHI. The 
significance of the error will itself vary according to the size of the shares that are 
inadvertently overestimated and the shares that are correspondingly reduced. 
A numerical illustration will once again be used to illustrate the point. Take an 
example of a four-firm market where the two leading firms have 40% shares and the 
other two 10% shares. The distribution would result in an HHI of 3400 (402 + 402 + 
102 +102 = 1600+1600+100+100=3400). 
Now suppose that the market share of one of the leading firms is erroneously 
estimated as 45% rather than 40%. If at the same time the other leaders share is 
estimated as 35%, then the HHI is increased only by 50 (452 + 352 + 102 + 102 = 
2025+ 1225+ 100+ 100=3450). However ifit is the share of one of the smaller firms 









= 2025+1600+100+25 equaling 3750) thus exceeding its 
correct value by over 10%. 
Why Do Merging Parties and Authorities Define Relevant Markets Differently? 
Page 39 
A second important property of the HID is that it reflects the shares of every firm in 
the market. This feature of the HID is regularly cited as one of the HID's advantages, 
although it is beneficial only if assuming each firm 's squared market accurately 
indicating the competitiveness of the market. The fact that the HID includes every 
firm is also cited as a potential limitation on its use, given the difficulty of learning 
smaller market shares, although it is unlikely that fringe firms will contribute 
significantly to HID's that are reaching levels of antitrust concern. 
A third characteristic of the HID is that any HID can be interpreted as a numbers 
equivalent. This means that one can readily compute the number of firms with equal 
market shares that would be necessary to produce any given HID by 0.0001 and 
taking for example an HID of 1250 corresponding to a market of eight equal-sized 
firms, since the reciprocal of .125 (1250 * 0001) is 8. 
Conversely to obtain the HID corresponding to a market with a given number of 
equal-sized firms, one multiplies the reciprocal of that number by 10000. Accordingly 
the HID corresponding to a market of five equal sized firms would be 
1/5* 10000=2000. This useful property aids in conceptualising the meaning of a 
particular HID level. 
HID ranges from a number approaching zero (many small firms and hence NO 
concentration) to 10000 (a monopoly). Current Competition Commission guidelines 
suggest that mergers in which the post merger HID is below 1000 are not 
concentrated markets. In contrast, a post-merger HID of 1800 is a concentrated 
market, for cases in which post merger HID' s are above 1800 the commission will 
usually attempt to block if HID increases by at least 50 points. 
2.11.1 Competition Policy 
"Competition policy creates a healthy business environment which is conducive to 
competitiveness and economic growth. An increasing number of developing countries 
have adopted competition policy in recent years" (Theron; 2002). 
"At least 37 developing countries and economies in transition already have 
competition legislation, and another 21 are in the process of revising or adopting such 
laws (Theron; 2002). 
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The origins of competition policy in South Africa date back to the Regulation of 
Monopolistic Conditions Act, 1955 (Act nO.24 of 1955). A review of the act in the 
1970's found that it had been unsuccessful in preventing a dramatic increase in 
oligopolies. As a result the Maintenance and Promotion of competition act was 
passed. The 1979 Act was amended in 1986 to give the competition Board further 
powers, including the ability to act not only against new concentrations of economic 
power but also existing monopolies and oligopolies. 
In 1995 after three years of consulting with experts and stakeholders, South Africa 
arrived at a new competition policy framework. In November of 1997, the department 
of trade and industry released proposed guidelines for competition policy entitled "A 
framework for Competition, Competitiveness and Development". These guidelines 
formed the basis for negotiations with the National Economic Labour and 
Development Council (NEDLAC). A NEDLAC agreement on competition policy was 
concluded on 20 May 1998. What followed was a 14-week public consultation 
process that brought into effect the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No, 89 of 1998). 
"Because of the challenges that follow from our legacy of economic distortions, a 
uniquely South African approach to competition is required. That policy must be 
grounded in the underlying mandate given to the department of industry through 
political process prior to the 1994 election, and through strategies of governance 
approved since. The new policy will fuse together these different mandates, by 
assuring the public that on the one hand competitiveness and efficiency are pursued, 
and on the other hand that the process will ensure access to many more people 
previously denied an equal opportunity to participate in the economy" 
(www.compcom.co.za). 
2.11.2 Government's Proposition 
• 
• 
A competition policy integrated with the overall objectives of national policy, as 
well as the particular objectives of the countries industrial and macro-economic 
policies. 
A more effective monopoly law directed at anti-competitive conduct, under the 
direction of an efficient administrative authority. 
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• The need to constantly review the Harmful Business Practices Act which bears 
principal responsibility for protecting consumer interests. 
• Reviewing the competitive interface between public corporations and the private 
sector. 
2.12 The New Competition Act 
' 'The stated purpose of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No.89 of 1998) is to promote 
and maintain competition in South Africa in order to achieve the following objectives: 
• To promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy. 
• To provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices. 
• To promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans 
• To expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the republic. 
• 
• 
To ensure the small and medium- sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity 
to participate in the economy 
To promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged person" (www.compcom.co.za). 
Three institutions are created in terms of the act to achieve the above objectives: 
1. The Competition Commission 
2. The Competition Tribunal 
3. The Competition Appeal court. 
2.12.1 The Competition Commission 
The Competition Commission has a range of functions in terms of Section 21 of the 
Act. These include investigating anti-competitive conduct in contravention with the 
act, assessing the impact of mergers and acquisitions on competition and taking 
appropriate action, monitoring competition levels and market transparency in the 
economy~ identifying impediments to competition and playing an advocacy role in 
addressing any of these impediments. 
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According to section 21(1) the Competition Commission is responsible to: 
1. Implement measures to increase market transparency. 
2. Implement measures to develop public awareness of the provisions of this act. 
3. Investigate and evaluate alleged contraventions of Chapter 2. 
4. Grant or refuse applications for exemption in terms of Chapter2. 
5. Authorise, with or without condition, prohibit or refer mergers of which it receives 
notice in terms of Chapter 3. 
6. Negotiate and conclude consent orders in terms of section 63 . 
7. Refer matters to the Competition Tribunal and appear before the tribunal as 
required by this Act. 
8. Negotiate agreements with any regulatory authority to co-ordinate and harmonise 
the exercise of jurisdiction over competition matters within the relevant industry 
or sector, and to ensure the consistent application of the principles of this Act. 
9. Participate in the proceedings of any regulatory authority. 
10. Advise, and receive advice from any regulatory authority. 
11 . Over time, review legislation and public regulation, and report 
to the Minister concerning any provision that permits uncompetitive behaviour. 
12. Deal with any other matter referred to it by the Tribunal" (www.compcom.co.za) . 
2.12.2 The Analytical Approach 
In assessing a merger transaction, the Commission, in terms of section 16 of the 
Competition Act No.89 of 1998, considered the following factors : 
• 
• 
In assessing any merger transaction, the Commission in the first instance, must 
determine whether or not the merger is likely to prevent or substantially lessen 
competition. 
Secondly, should a merger have potential anti-competitive effects, the 
Commission must establish whether there are any technology, efficiency or other 
pro-competitive gains that will result from the transaction, which would redeem 
the substantive adverse impact on competition. 
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• Thirdly, in assessing any merger transaction, the Competition Commission must 
also determine whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public 
interest grounds regardless of whether the merger is likely to substantially prevent 
or lessen competition. 
In taking the points above into account, the Commission must balance issues related 
to competition with the broader social and economic goals outlined in the Act, such as 
employment, international competitiveness, efficiency and technology gains as well 
as the ability of small and medium sized businesses and firms owned or controlled by 
historically disadvantaged persons to compete. 
In addition to the functions listed in subsection (1), the Competition Commission 
may: 
1. Report to the Minister on any matter relating to the application of this Act. 
2. Enquire into and report to the Minister on any matter concerning the purposes of 
this Act. 
3. Perform any other function assigned to it in terms of this or any other Act. 
2.12.3 Structure of the Competition Commission 
The Commissioner is the Chief Executive Officer of the Competition Commission. 
The Commissioner is appointed for a five-year term and is accountable to the Minister 
of Trade and Industry and Parliament. Currently the Competition Commission has a 
staff complement of over 90. 
The six divisions in the Commission reflect its core activities: 
1. Enforcement & Exemptions 
2. Mergers & Acquisitions 
3. Compliance 
4. Legal Services 
5. Policy & Research 
6. Corporate Services 
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2.12.4 The Mergers and Acquisitions Division 
The Mergers and Acquisitions Division conducts merger reviews in terms of Chapter 
3 of the Act. The division has a staff complement of 13 persons and 3 graduate 
trainees, which includes lawyers, economists, a forensic accountant and 
administrative personnel.(www.compcom.co.za) 
A merger analysis consists of four broad steps. The Division will investigate whether 
• The transaction falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission; 
• The transaction is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition; 
• Any anti-competitive effects can be justified on the basis of objectively verifiable 
evidence of technological or efficiency gains 
• The competition effects will benefit or harm public interest, including the effects 
on employment, the ability of firms owned or controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons to compete, the development of particular industries or 
regions, and international competitiveness 
• Both the long-term and short-term effects of the merger are taken into 
consideration. 
• All the above must be balanced against each other to determine whether the 
merger should be approved, approved subject to conditions or opposed. 
2.13 Competition Tribunal 
The Tribunal ' s main functions are to grant exemptions, authorise or prohibit large 
mergers (with or without conditions) or prohibit a merger, adjudicate in relation to 
any conduct prohibited in terms of Chapter 2 or 3 of the Act and to grant an order for 
costs in terms of section 57 of the Act on matters presented to it by the Commission. 
The Tribunal is established in terms of section 26 of the Act and has jurisdiction 
throughout the Republic. It is a tribunal of record and independent from the other 
competition institutions. The Tribunal is headed by a chairperson appointed by the 
President of the Republic. In addition the Act requires the appointment ofa minimum 
of three and a maximum of ten Tribunal members, who are also appointed by the 
President and may be either full-time or part-time, depending on the recommendations 
of the Minister. Each member of the Tribunal, including the Chairperson, serves for a 
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term of five years but may be re-appointed for the second term. The Chairperson may 
not serve for more than two consecutive terms (www.comptrib.co.za). 
2.14 Competition Appeals Court 
The Competition Appeal Court is established in terms of section 36 of the 1998 Act. It 
has similar status to that of a High Court. It has jurisdiction throughout the Republic 
and is a court of record. 
The Competition Appeal Court may consider any appeal from, or review of, a 
decision of the Competition Tribunal; confirm, amend or set aside a decision or an 
order that is subject of appeal or review by the Competition Tribunal; and give any 
judgment or make any order that the circumstances require. Finally, the Competition 
Appeal Court must confirm an order by the Competition Tribunal for the divestiture 
of assets by parties who have merged in contravention of chapter 3 of the Act. 
The members of the Appeal Court are appointed by the State President in accordance 
with section 174 of the Constitution. The Act requires that at least three members 
must be judge of the High Court, one of whom must be designated by the President to 
be the Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court. In addition, two other 
members, who are South Mrican citizen, have suitable qualifications and experience 
in economics, law, commerce industry or public affairs, and are committed to the 
purposes and principles mentioned in Section 2 of the Act. 
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Merger Notice 
Competition Commission Recommendation 
Notice of Set Down 
Pre-hearing Conference 
Hearing 
Merger Clearance Certificate Prohibition of Merger 
~~ 
Reasons 
CC Revocation Application 
Revoke 
Firm concerned may request 
Appeal Court to review the 
notice 
Confirm approval or 
conditional approval 
DeeisioD 
Figure 2.4: Procedures When Applying for a Large Merger 






• Promote a greater spread of ownership in particular to 
increase ownership of previously disadvantaged persons 
• Ensure that small and medium sized enterprises have 
equitable opportunity to participate in the economy 
• Promote employment and advance the social 
and economic welfare of SA 
• Existence of barriers to entry 
• Availability of substitutes 
• Relevant market 
• Market share 

















It has been established that whilst there are many peripheral factors to be considered 
when determining an outcome of a merger, the critical issues according to literature 
are defining relevant markets, determining market share and calculating market 
concentrations. 
The case below will illustrate the plight of the merging parties (UnileverlRobertsons) 
to convince the authorities (Competition Commission of South Africa) to define the 
relevant market in which its products are sold in broader terms. The concept to bear in 
mind when reading the case is that merging parties and authorities define relevant 
markets differently because it is in their interest to do so. Merging parties are driven 
by profit and strive to maximise their shareholders wealth. A major concern to the 
merging parties is that their merger be rejected by competition authorities. A broader 
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market allows for more leeway for the merging parties with substantially less chance 
of the merger being blocked. 
The authorities interest lies in protecting the consumer from monopolistic behaviour. 
A narrower market definition allows the parties for less leeway when determining 
their products market share in relation to their competitors. A narrower market 
definition allows for lower risk of monopolistic behaviour that in turn leads to greater 
protection of the consumer. 
The Competition Tribunal is an independent body whose responsibility it is to provide 
an unbiased judgment on every large merger that takes place in South Africa. The 
case to follow will illustrate each party's market definitions as well as the Tribunal ' s 
final verdict. 
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CHAPTER 3: FOOD INDUSTRY ON A WORLDWIDE SCALE 
3.1 Introduction 
The food industry evolution on a worldwide scale may be diyided into three periods. 
From about 1920 to 1945 innovation in manufacturing techniques enabled the 
establishment of national markets for food distribution. At the beginning of this 
period, retail concentration was minima and the concept of the chain store was still in 
its infancy. 
The second period, between about 1945 and the 1980' s, saw the advent of 
manufacturing productions on a multinational scale. High transport costs and import 
substitution policies led to the establishment in many countries of foreign owned 
manufacturing plants, contributing in turn to the development of supermarket chains 
in first world as well as third world countries. 
In the 80' s and 90's companies entered into a period of Globalisation in part due to 
the globalisation of capital markets and the recognition by consumers of brands on a 
worldwide scale. Distribution channels have also changed dramatically with the rise 
and consolidation of one-stop shopping in supermarkets, as well as increased 
concentration of the retail sector in most countries has been accompanied by the 
establishment of the multinational retailer. 
The trend towards consolidation in the food industry worldwide has been partly due to 
mergers and acquisitions: 
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Table 3.1: Trend Towards Consolidation 



















1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Year 
Figure 3.1: Consolidation in Food Industry Worldwide 
Mergers in the food industry, including those between processors, retailers, 
wholesalers and brokers, reached an all-time high in 1998 with 813 significant deals 
being recorded in the Food Institute survey. The number of mergers and acquisitions 
have increased every year since 1991 when 365 were reported. 
Large mergers to be highlighted include the 1996 merger of Nestle and General Mills. 
In 2000 Phillip Morris agreed to by Nabisco Holdings for $14.9 billion. In Europe 
British Food and Beverage Diageo PLC sold its Pillsbury unit to General Mills for 
$5 .4 billion. 
3.1.1 Concentration in Food Manufacturing 
It is not unusual to find a high proportion of sales of a particular product line being 
supplied by a small number of manufacturers. This arises from the fact that successful 
companies tend to get larger and as a result market concentration may increase. 
The following table shows the proportion of sales of different product line supplied by 
the largest three manufacturers in a number of countries. On these definitions the 
average across all ten countries in 1998 was 68%. 
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Three Firm Concentration Ratios in Food Product Categories 1998 
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Table 3.2: Background to the New Joint Venture Company in SA 
A 3 firm concentration ratio in food product categories in South Africa shows that 
concentration ratios for a particular narrow product line tends to be high, as is the case 













Frozen Prepared Foods 
All Petfoods 
Biscuits excl Rusks 
Pilchards 
Fruit Juices 
Average of the Above (Un-weighted) 


















Table 3.3: Concentration Ratios - Food Products 
Source: www.europe-economics.com 
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3.2 U nileverlRobertsons 
The case study focuses on the 2002 Merger ofUnilever and Robertsons. It will be 
examined from the viewpoint of the merging parties, and both the Competition 
Commission and the Competition Tribunal, 
Unifoods and Robertsons focus on different socio-economic groups. 
Robertson' s strength has been built on supplying lower income consumers, whilst 
Unifood's strength comes from supplying middle to higher income consumers. This is 
illustrated in the following chart. The grouping used is by LSM (Living Standard 
Measure) that classifies people by variables such as employment, education and 
ownership of consumer durables (e.g. television sets and cars). The scale ranges from 
LSM 1, the lowest socio economic group to LSM 8, the highest. 
The chart shows the shares of sales value that each company had in different LSM 
categories in the 12 months to Feb 2000. 
40 ..,..."".,.,,==== 
35 -:r-,.....".-'=i'-"..-~--"..;.-__f I--~-'lj 
30 +----~----"-.--+~__f f---,---'l 









LSM LSM LSM LSM LSM LSM 
1-3 4 5 6 7 8 
o Robertsons 
DUnilever 
Figure 3.2: Contribution of Total Turnover by Social Group 
Source: Titan Economics Report (2001) 
3.2.1 Market Definition from the Viewpoint of the Merging Parties 
The merging parties have considered a number of alternative ways in which the 
markets may be defined. There is a body of evidence and reasoning supporting the 
view that food markets should be broadly defined, since different kinds of foods are 
substitutable at the stage at which a meal is prepared. The merging parties considered 
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a narrower market definition based on a categorisation of processed foods according 
to ways in which consumers are perceived to view the alternatives available to meet 
particular cooking or meal requirements. Four main categories, two of which are sub-
divided are identified giving a total of six functional markets. A third alternative 
market definition would use the even narrower product lines identified for market 
research purposes by companies such as AC.Nielsen. 
At one level, almost all food, fresh as well as processed is substitutable. The merging 
parties identify this not just because an individuals hunger can be satisfied to some 
extent by any kind of food. 
"Potential substitution between food products is generally very large, since before 
embarking on preparations for a given meal the consumer will often have a range of 
options. Once the core component of the meal is decided, the remaining ingredients 
become complements rather than substitutes and the options become narrower. 
However, this is less relevant for the study of competition than allowing a longer 
time-scale, in which consumers have an affordable opportunity to adjust their 
purchase. The question whether supplies have market power must be assessed by 
references to a longer time scale than is involved in the planning of meals" (Titans 
Economics Report, 2001). 
3.2.2 Functional Market Definitions 
Unifoods and Robertsons recognise 4 divisions of the processed food market, on the 
basis of their observation and interpretation of consumers' use of the various 
products. The four functional divisions and two subdivisions are: 
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Sauces - including different types of sauces, relishes and marinades. 
Chutney Dry Cook-in Sauce 
Dry Marinades Dry pasta sauce 
Dry pour-over sauce Mayonnaise 
Pickles Salad dressings 
Tomato Sauce Wet Cook-in Sauce 
Wet marinades Wet pasta sauce 









The merging parties do not claim that there is no likelihood of cross-substitution 
between these 6 groups, but it is argued that the distinctions between them are 
sufficiently clear from the consumer perspective that they constitute relevant market 
definitions. 
According to the merging parties the narrow product categories used by the market 
research firms such as AC Nielsen may also be regarded as relevant markets for these 
purposes as long as there was little substitutability from one such category to another. 
In order to resolve the question of the relevant market definition on an objective basis, 
the quantitative analysis was carried out on both the functional definitions as well as 
the narrow categories to see what product categories could be established as markets 
for the purpose of a competition assessment. 
3.2.3 Market Concentration 
The merging parties argue that it is usual to find a high proportion of the sales of a 
particular product line are supplied by a small number of manufacturers. This may 
arise from the fact that successful companies tend to get larger and as a result market 
concentration may increase. The mere existence of concentrated growth per se is not a 
cause for concern to competition authorities, it is the misuse of market power that is 
the real concern for authorities. 
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Comparison of Product Lines and Brands - Consumer Market 
product line and brand 
fats 
cook1"" ",Is (bottles. Uns & drums) 
marganne & medium tat spreads (bna. & 'ub.) 
$(.)Up mxes (sachets & canons) 
soya monce 
stew bases (sishebo mOles) 
Instant COOk·in sauces (casserole sauces, recipe 
"""OS & marinades) 








d'\eases (tela. cream cheese, camembert, bne. 
btu. & mozzarella) 
processed cheese (Wedges & portions) 
black tea (bag. & loose) 
moibos la. 
tea based beverages 
salt & pepper 





marinade. (.achels & wets 
mayonnaise 
peanut butter 





tomato based ingredients 
stock cuileS 
SOld by U o lfQQd? 
Ves· HoIsum 
Ves· FIor3. Helios & Cotona 
Ves· Rama. Rama Lite. Rcndo. Stork. Stork Country 
Spread. Aora L~' . FIor3 Extra Ltght & FIor3 ProaCllV 
Yes · Royco$oup 
Ves - Royco Vl\amince 
Ves • Royco Shel><>-Mix 
Yes ·Royco 
Ves ·Royco 
Yes· Mrs Salrs 
Yes ·Ro1Co 
Yes. Rouco Mince Mate, Royco Tuna Mate & Royco 
Pasta & sauce 
ves· Royco Cup...a-Soup & Royco Cup-a-Snack 
Yes - Oxo 
Yes - Melrose 
Yes- Simonsberg 
Ye.s-MeJrose 
Yes . Joke, Glen, PiIl:o & Liptcn Yellow Label 
Ye •• Laager, Uptcn Rooiboo & Upton Het1lals 





















Yes - Knotr ana Knorrox 
Yu • Knorrox 
Yes - Robertson's "fikelele . 
Yas - Knorr. Knorr Recipe MIX, Knorr Unbehevaole Chicken 




Ves - KnotT Quid< Soup, Knorr Oodles cl Noode. 







Ve. - RoOertson'., Robertscn'. FreshlV Ground 
Yes - RoberIson's 
Yes - Robert5on'. Rajah 
Yes - Knorr Atomat 
Ves-Maizena 
Ye. - Robertsoo', Gold 'n' Cnspy 
Yes - Knorr and Meal Mate 
Yes - Hellman'. 
Yes-Sklppy 
Yes-carrnel 
Ves - RClI>ersIon'S 
Yes-RClI>erstoo'. 
Yes - RoIlor-Hon's 
Yes-RClI>erslon'. 
Yes - Knorr Paste Maker 
Yes - Knorr and Knorrox 
Comparison of Product Lines and Brands - Professional Market 
prod"ct 'ine and brand 
cooking oils 





salt & pepper (portion sachets & cartons) 
herbs & spices 
spice blends (cani.ters, cartOns & buckets) 
curry powder (cartons) 
stock powders (canisters & buckets) 
MSG blends (canisters, cartons & buckets) 
cornflower 
soup mixes 
pour-ov,r sauces (portion sachets, cartons, 
bottles & buckets) 
salad dressing mixes (cartons) 
mayonnaise (bottles & buckets) 




Sold by Hudson & Knight Sold hy Robe dsQos FQOd $eOljces 
Yes - Crispa. Helios &Cotona No 
Yes - MarveiIQ Flora, Stor1<,Pastrex. GoIdBake& Planto No 
Yes - Meadowtand 
Yes 
Yes - Mrs Balfs 

















Yes - Fine Foods 
No 
Yes - Robertson's & Trimpak 
Yes - Robertson's 
Yes - Robertson's 
Yes - Robertson's Rajah 
Yes - Knorr 
Yes - Knorr Aromat 
Ye. - Malzena 
Yes 
Yes - Carmel, Fine Food, Knorr, Caterplan 
Yes - Cannel, Heliman's, KItorr Caterplan 
Yes 
Yes · Trimpak 
Yes - Robertson's 
Yes - Robertson's 
Table 3.4: Comparison of Product Lines and Brands 
Table 3.4 shows that in the consumer market (sales to retailers for re-sale to 
individual consumers) there are many product lines that are provided by one of the 
two companies: 
"Robertsons produce no fats, cooking oils or margarines, cheese or tea, which are 
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Table 3.8: RHI Rates Nielsen Product Definitions (NPD) 
Source: Titans Economics Report (2001) 
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Source: Titans Economics Report (2001) 
The above tables present market shares of food manufacturers. These figures refer to 
the value of shares of the manufacturers in the Nielsen categories and in the functional 
market definitions. Those companies selling products in either the Nielsen categories 
or in the functional markets that have not been individually identified have been 
classified as others (at the end of the table), but their market share has been included 
in the calculation. 
The change in the HHI is the difference between the HHI after and before the 
combination of Unifoods and Robertsons businesses (combination always increases 
the HHI), while the accretion rate refers to the market share gained by the largest 
company as a result of the merger. The tables show the change to the party' s market 
share if the merger goes through and also the effect on concentration in the different 
markets identified. The table suggests that the merger has potential anti-competitive 
effects, but not in the functional market definition used by Unifoods. 
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3.3 Commission Viewpoint of Relevant Product Market 
"The Commission does not accept the parties submission that the relevant product 
market encompasses such broad market definition. The narrower relevant market 
definition, as captured by the NPD categories, are to be preferred in most cases, in 
line with the European Commission approach. The narrower definitions correspond to 
products with similar and distinctive attributes for one or more non-substitutable use. 
The parties' broad categories contain product so diverse that they are only substitutes 
for certain uses or for certain occasions, whereas consumers would thereafter revert to 
using a particular product for its unique attributes" (Commissions recommendations 
and reasons - 55/LM/Sep 01). 
According to the Commission demarcation of a relevant product market can be done 
by establishing the extent to which the merged entity' s products are interchangeable 
or substitutable, by virtue of their characteristics, price and functionality. Demarcation 
can also be achieved on the basis of the degree of cross elasticity of demand between 
the merged entity' s products and the products that are perceived substitutes for them. 
The mere fact that there is some small degree of cross elasticity of demand between 
products does not mean that they are substitutes for the purpose of antitrust analysis 
and does not require their inclusion in the same product market. 
The Commission uses two American cases to further highlight this point: 
United States vs. Aluminium Company of America - The Supreme Court held that 
copper insulated wire was not in the same markets as aluminium insulated wire 
despite the fact that some customers used both types of wire for the same purpose. 
US vs. Dairy Farmer of America - The Department of Justice (DOJ) argued that 
butter did not fall into the same market as margarine. Furthermore it was found that 
retail customers of branded whipped cream butter considered it to be a distinct 
product from private label whipped butter and stick butter. 
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3.3.1 Unilever-Robertsons vs. Competition Commission 
"All in all the Commission regards the econometric analysis performed by the parties 
to be inconclusive as to whether the NPD categories or the parties' broader categories 
are more appropriate, due to the inadequacies of the dataset. This differs from the 
parties interpretation of the same results". (Commissions recommendations and 
reasons - 55ILMJSep 01). 
The parties feel that their studies reject the NPD categories as relevant markets for 
competition analysis. The Commission is still of the opinion that the econometric 
research conducted by the parties was inconclusive. The parties in contrast, state that 
the most refined and sophisticated versions of their models refute the appropriateness 
of the NPD market definitions, but cannot confirm their own broad categories. 
The Commission concludes, "the studies submitted by the parties cannot be taken to 
demonstrate the existence of a wider product market in spite of the technical 
sophistication of these studies. The Commission would submit that the sophistication 
of the econometric techniques employed is overkill when applied to such an 
inadequate dataset, and that as such the results prove nothing". (Commissions 
recommendations and reasons - 55ILMJSep 01). 
The Commission concludes that for the reasons mentioned above, for the purpose of 








Pour Over Sauces 
Instant Soups 
Black Spreads 
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According to the Commission the majority of the competitors considered these 
products to be in separate markets. The Commission uses the example of soup to 
illustrate this point. Whilst the parties in their legal submissions defined the Instant 
Soup and Packet Soup as the "soup market" the Commissions standpoint differs. 
Instant soup is typically sold for consumption in single portions and is seen as a 
savoury alternative to tea or coffee. They are ready to drink products, requiring the 
addition of boiling water in a mug. According to competitors, this is a unique product 
with sophisticated formulations to meet the desired tastes. 
Packet soups are traditional, multi-portion soups for preparation in a pot with added 
water. Packet soup retails for about Rl,89 whereas instant soup retails at about R6.69. 
3.3.2 Market Shares and Market Concentration. 
In the Commissions view the proposed merger would create or strengthen a dominant 
position in the following categories (all except for soya mince). 
Packet Soup (77.5%) 
Sishebo Mixes (95 .6%) 
Salad Dressing (69.8%) 
Recipe Mixes (66.2%) 
Dry Marinades (99.8%) 
Pour-over sauces (82.2%) 
Dry pasta sauces (82.1%) 
Instant soup (88.8%) 
Black spreads (99.5%) 
The Commission points out that whilst it is impossible to give a general market share 
threshold above which sufficient market power for causing restrictive effects can be 
assumed. However, market power usually arises when the market share is at least 
15%. At higher market share, such as 25% to 30% the degree of monopoly power 
may become quite significant, and market shares over 40 to 50% usually give 
assurances of strong market power. 
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The Commission goes further to state "although market share is a valuable tool for 
evaluating the possible market powers of firms, a more important measure is industry 
concentration levels. It is evident that there is a very high level of concentration 
within each of the markets identified by the commission which will be further 
augmented post merger". (Commissions recommendations and reasons - 55ILMlSep 
01). 
3.4 The Competition Tribunal 
The Competition Tribunal determined that the Competition Commission adopted its 
position in relation to the market definition largely on the basis that the parties to the 
international transaction had adopted a view of the relevant markets in their European 
filing which was similar to the NPD categories "believing that there was no credible 
reason to suppose that the demand patterns for South Africa would be radically 
different. However, this approach fails to take cognisance of the considerable 
evidence that the SA market is indeed distinctive to the European market". 
( www.comptrib/cases.co.za ) 
Whilst the Commission criticises the statistical exercise and quantitative analysis 
undertaken by the merging parties to determine market definition, the tribunal points 
out that the Commission "did not conduct any of its own research. The only research 
conducted in this matter was performed by the merging parties" 
(www.comptrib/cases.co.za). 
Most significantly, competitor of the merging parties do not adhere to the Nielsen 
market segmentation. Even Floyd' s food, the most vigorous opponent of the merger 
defines the relevant markets by use of a broader market. Their response to defining a 
relative market was highlighted by the following example "packet soup is widely used 
by consumers throughout the income and living standard profile as cooking 
ingredients to enhance the flavour of meal preparation. It is generally accepted that 
60% of packet soup is thus used as flavour ingredients for food preparation". 
( www.comptrib/cases.co.za ) 
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Ina Paarman also refers to a broader market definition. "We would increasingly be 
looking at broader market definitions as this view increases our opportunity by 
increasing the potential size of the market". (www.comptrib/cases.co.za) 
The merging parties competitors do not endorse NPD' s on the basis upon which 
product definition should take place. "Indeed it is evident that in the main, the 
majority of the competitors supported the merging parties product market 
definitions" . (www.comptrib/cases.co.za) 
The Tribunal criticises the simple application of AC Nielsen data by making mention 
of Alan Watson ofUnifoods submission to the Competition Tribunal : 
" The lowest level clusters used are called product classes which are usually defined 
along strictly historical or product format dimensions in order to assist AC Nielsen 
store auditors to collect the correct information. A structure which allows a simple 
practical way to collect data is a priority over use of definitions which would 
accurately reflect product substitutability ... .it is clear that AC Nielsen product classes 
do not constitute product markets that are relevant for business use or competition 
analysis. There is no industry agreed segmentation, however leading players in each 
field owe their success to a sound understanding of segmentation and successful 
players therefore find that similar approaches have been developed independently". 
(www.comptrib/cases.co.za) 
The Competition Tribunal accordingly concluded that "while the econometric 
analysis conducted by the merging parties is not decisive, there is a sufficient body of 
evidence to indicate that the narrow market definitions relied upon by the Competition 
Commission do not properly reflect the market segmentation with which participants 
in these markets are determined. Even the most conservative approach to market 
definition, the AC Nielsen categories, do not appear to capture proper market 
segmentation and hence there are good grounds for supposing that the extent of 
dominance found by the Competition Commission to result from the merger is a 
considerable exaggeration of the position ... the market approximates more closely to 
what is set out in the merging parties filing than what is set out in the Competition 
Commissions recommendations and reasons" . (www.comptrib/cases.co.za) 
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3.5 Conclusion 
After having heard both parties, the following order was made by the TribunaL 
"In essence, the merging parties have agreed to dispose of the Royco brand, the Oxo 
brand and the Quick Soup and Oodles of Noodles sub brands. The merging parties 
will however retain the Cup-a-Soup, Cup-a-Snack and ''Pasta & Sauce" sub-brands. 
The merger is approved on the conditions that follow: 
The merging parties shall dispose of the following assets ('<the divested assets") to a 
buyer being an independent third party or parties approved by the Commission. 
Royco Brand: 
This will include all Royco products, save for the sub-brands "Quick Soup" and 
"Oodles of Noodles" together with at the option of the proposed buyer, a license to 
use these sub-brand names together with the Knorr brand for a maximum of two 
years. 
Oxo Brand: 
This will include the sale of the Oxo brand in totality. 
• 
• 
For each brand or sub brand referenced to above, the sale will include all the 
intellectual property associated with the brand, i.e. packaging design, 
formulations, intellectual rights to advertising and promotion material, finished 
goods and packaging material stock. 
The divestiture could, at the option of the proposed buyer, include production 
facilities either to be used in a co-packaging arrangement (by means of a service 
agreement) or as an outright sale of all the assets. 
The following assets ("the excluded assets") are excluded from the divested assets and 
will remain the property of the merging parties: 
• 
• 
The sub-brand "Cup-a-Soup" including ''Lite'' and "Thick and Creamy" 
The sub-brand "Cup-a-Snack" 
Why Do Merging Parties and Authorities Define Relevant Markets Differently? 
Page 67 
• The sub-brand "Mates" including "Chicken Mate", 'Mince Mate" and "Tuna 
Mate" 
• The sub-brand ' 'Pasta and Sauce" including "Macaroni and Cheese". 
The excluded assets including any intellectual property associated with the sub-
brands, i.e. packaging design, fonnulation, intellectual rights to advertising and 
promotional material, finished goods and packaging and material stock will not form 
part of the divested assets. 
The merging parties shall submit the name of the proposed buyer to the Commission 
for its prior approval, together with the relevant documentation in respect of the 
proposed buyer in order that the Commission can assess whether the proposed buyer 
would be able to effectively utilise the divested assets so as to be a viable competitor 
to the merging parties. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
Initially when addressing the question of demand side substitutability the merging 
parties found that there was short time series problems with the definition of prices 
and econometric specification were affecting the possibility of substitution between 
different product lines. To deal with some of these problems, bi-monthly data on 
brand product prices, volumes and revenues for 27 of the Nielsen product definitions 
were assembled for the period between ApriVMay 1998 and April/May 2001. Having 
a large number of branded products, cross-sectoral as well as the time series 
observations could be exploited. 
With this information the merging parties focused on whether the data presented by 
Nielsen were relevant markets in the sense appropriate for competition analysis. If 
they were relevant markets, it was expected that the evidence would be found of 
significant substitutability of different products within each of the 27 product groups 
(upon a change in their relative price), and also that their was much more limited 
substitution of products from one market to another. "Consider for instance one of the 
27 product lines, wet cook-in sauce. There are 5 significant brands of wet cook-in 
sauce. If the price of one of them were to increase, other things being equal, one 
would expect a significant shift of sales from this brand to the other four" (Titans 
Economics Report, 2001). 
The other way this is tested !S to calculate the cross-price elasticity of the different 
brands, i.e. what is the effect on the volume of sales of one brand if its own price 
elasticity remains unchanged whilst the prices of the other four brands are increased 
by the same proportionate amount. In this case the estimate obtained is a shade over 
1, meaning that a ten percent increase in the price of four of the wet cook in sauces 
would lead to an increase of just over 10 percent in the sales volumes achieved by the 
brand whose prices did not increase. This would be a reasonably significant degree of 
substitutability, consistent with the idea that all five brands are in the same market. 
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Product Between Products Between NPD and 
WiL"1in NPD . consumerfunctional market 
Functional Market 1 (a). Cooking Ingredients - Flavour enhancers 
Regular soup 0.538 0.559 
Ec.onomy soup -0.629 -0.011 
Herbs & spices axe) 0.746 0.664 
pepper 
Pepper 0.297 0.286 
Salt 0.209 -0.080 
Flavourings 0.357 0.303 
Stock cubes 0.649 0.470 
Curry 'powder 1.004 1.102 
Functional Market 1(b). Cooking Ingredients - Meal Makers 
Curried veg. 1.125 2.055 
Chakalaka 2.589 9.n3 
Functional Market 2. Sauces 
Wet cook in sauce 1.054 3.992 
Dry cook in sauce 0.4:37 5.344 
Wet marinades 0.842 2.263 
Dry marinades 1.015 1.551 
Dry pout-over 1.732 2.652 
sauce 
Dry pasta sauce ~0.817 -1 .857 
Chutney 0.471 0.009 
Salad dressings 0.304 a,on 
Tomato sauce 1.695 2.862 
Mayonnaise 0.513 0,486 
Wet pasta sauce 0.513 -8.994 
Pickles 1.630 2.386 
FUnctional Market 3 (a) . Family Ready Meals 
Meal kits -0.813 -4.250 





Functional Market 4. Flavoured Spreads 
Peanut butter 1.091 1.855 
Cheese spread 0.881 -0.747 
Table 4.1: Cross Price Elasticities of Products 
Page 69 
The merging parties used the table above to illustrate the wide range of estimates of 
cross-price elasticities from about 2.6 (for chakalaka) to in some cases a negative 
figure. They use this point to highlight that the variance in the degree of 
substitutability within the AC Nielsen product definition suggests that their economic 
significance as potential relevant market definitions also varies, and that they cannot 
be relied on for the purpose of defining a market. The conclusion of the merging 
parties is that the market definition selected will have a considerable bearing on the 
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conduct of the assessment of the effects of the joint venture. If the market is defined 
too narrowly, products that effectively compete with each other end up being 
classified under different classes. 
4.2 The Panel Data Approach 
The primary focus of this exercise was to test the Nielsen Product Definitions against 
broader market definitions. The merging parties found that to confine the analysis 
only to time dimensions would be wasteful. To solve that, they considered another 
approach to explaining spending patterns: a statistical analysis that benefited not only 
from the time dimensions but also from the cross-sectional variations in the data. This 
was referred to as the Panel Data Approach. 
Using a panel data approach where the merging parties have information on brands, 
for a number of markets over time, one can break down the effects on consumption 
patterns of a number of factors that cannot be measured directly. The Panel Data can 
be useful when the unobserved differences can be accounted for allowing the 
researcher to disentangle the effects of product substitution from the effects of time, 
markets or brands. 
The model takes the following form: 
a - is a constant 
q it - is the quantity bought of brand-product i in time t - for example the volume 
bought ofMaggi packet soup. 
<Pi - is an effect that depends exclusively on the branded product. This is a way to 
determine product characteristics unique to that product. 
P it - the price of the brand product I in time T. It is expected that the coefficient in 
this variable is negative as it represents an own price elasticity. 
pjt
N 
- The price of other brands in the Nielsen Product Definition 
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p jt U _ The price index of other products available to the consumer in the Unifoods 
market definition. The index is constructed in a similar way to the Nielsen Product 
Definition and represents an indicator of the substitution possibilities within the 
Unifoods markets. 
p jt S - The price index of the best substitute available to the consumer as defined by 
the switching survey 
S - ijt - Is a measure of purchasing power 
t - A time trend representing possible trends in the economy as a whole 
E - the usual error term 
The advantages of the model include the ability to test different alternatives about 
market definition. It also increases the number of observations as both the time series 
and the cross section analysis are exploited. The number of observations is equal to 
the number of periods available (around 19) times the number of brands in a NPD 
(average of 4.5) times the number ofNPD' s (27). The number of observations 
relevant for the analysis are now increased to 2,200. 
The model found that despite the likely differentiation between brands, consumers 
react to price. "The expenditure measure coefficient tends to be significant and quite 
robust" (Titan Economics Report, 2001). 




NPD X-pri ce 
elasticity 
Funct ional Market 
X-elasticity 
Functional Market 1(a). Cooking Ingredients - Flavour Enhancers 
Cuny powder -0.406 1.004 1.102 
Economy soup -1 .496 -0.629 -0.011 
Flavourings 0.844 0.357 0.303 
H&S excl Pepper -0.530 0.746 0.664 
Pepper -0.548 0.297 0.286 
Regular soup -2.532 0.538 0.559 
Salt -0.699 0.209 -0.080 
Slockcubes 0.082 0.649 0.470 
Functional Market 1(b). Cooking Ingredients· Meal Makers 
Chakalaka 
Curried veg . 
Chutney 
Ory Cook in Sauce 
Dry marinades 
Dry pasta sauce 





Wet Cook in SaL!ce 
Wet marinades 
Wet Pasta sauce 
Meal kits 
4.533 2.589 9.17 
-0.163 1.125 2.055 
Functional Market 2. Sauces 
-1 .733 0.471 




-1 .147 0.513 
1.012 1.630 
-1.186 0.304 
























-1.4 12 -D.517 
-2.315 -0.716 







Table 4.2: Cross Price Elasticities using Data Panel Approach 
The merging parties argument for using functional markets is highlighted in the Panel 
Data Table 4.2. For example, the cross-price elasticities ofNPD for regular soup are 
very similar to the cross-price elasticity of Functional Markets of regular soup. It 
would not therefore be justifiable to regard such soup as constituting a separate 
market. 
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4.3 Impact of Market Definition on Market Share 
4.3.1 Functional Market Definition 
Manufacturers Market Shares 
Unifoods 4.3 
Robertsons 65.4 
Imana Foods 3.6 
National Brands 3.3 
Nestle 2.9 
Osman Brothers 2.9 
Own Brands 3.8 
Other 13 .8 
Total 100 % 
Pre Merger HRI 
Concentration Levels 
Change in HHI 

















Table 4.3: Cooking Ingredients Flavour Enhancers 
14% 
D Unilever/Robertsons 
o Imana Foods 
o National Brands 
o Nestle 
Osman Brothers 
D Own Brands 
[] Other 
Figure 4.1: Cooking Ingredients Flavour Enhancers 
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Manufacturers Market Shares Market 
Concentration 
Levels 
Unifoods 1.5 2.25 
Robertsons 21.1 445.21 
ImanaFoods 17.6 309.76 
Packo 6.2 38.44 
Nestle 5.9 34.81 
Tiger Brands 21.2 449.44 
Own Brands 4.7 22.09 
Other 21.8 475 .24 
Total 100 % 
Pre Merger HRI 1777.24 
Concentration Levels 
Change in HRI 63.3 
Post Merger HHI 1840.54 
Concentration Levels 
Table 4.4: Cooking Ingredients Meal Makers 
[J Unilever 




o Own Brands 
[] Other 
Figure 4.2: Cooking Ingredients Meal Makers 











Pre Merger HHI 
Concentration Levels 
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Table 4.5: Sauces 
25% 


















o Food Corp 
D Nestle 
Tiger Brands 
D Own Brands 
Other 
Why Do Merging Parties and Authorities Define Relevant Markets Differently? 









Pre Merger RHI 
Concentration Levels 
ChangeinHm 
Post Merger HHI 
Concentration Levels 

























Why Do Merging Parties and Authorities Define Relevant Markets Differently? 
Page 77 
Manufacturers Market Shares Market 
Concentration 
Levels 
Unifoods 67.4 4542.76 
Robertsons 21.1 445.21 
Floyd' s 3.3 10.89 
Nestle 3.3 10.89 
Own Brands 3.9 15 .21 
Other 1 1 
Total 100 % 
Pre Merger BBI 5025.8 
Concentration Levels 
Change in HHI 2844.44 
Post Merger HHI 7870.24 
Concentration Levels 




o Own Brands 
Other 
Figure 4.5: Ready Meals Personal Meals (Instant Soups Only) 
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Table 4.8: Spreads 
23% 
















GJ Own Brands 
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4.3.2 AC Nielsen Definitions 





Own Brand 1l.7 
Star Products 10.2 
Other .7 
Total 100 
Pre Merger HHI 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 
Post Merger HRI 
Concentration Levels 
Table 4.9: Packet Soup 
10% 1% 


















D Own Brand 
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D Other 







Pre Merger HID 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 















Table 4.10: Sbisbebo Mixes 
95% 
Figure 4.8: Sisbebo Mixes 
o Unilever/Robertsons 
Dlmana 
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Manufacturer Market Share Market Concentration 
Levels 
Unifoods 14.4 207.36 
Robertsons 55.4 3096.16 
Hoskins .2 0. 04 
InaPaarman 10.2 104.04 
Kraft 1.1 1.21 
Nando 's 1.2 1.44 
Own Brand 1.9 3.61 
Steers 14.4 207.36 
Others 1.2 1.2 
Total 100% 
Pre Merger HHI 3622.42 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 1568.52 
Post Merger HHI 5190.94 
Concentration Levels 




o Ina Paarman 
o Kraft 
Nando's 
o Own Brand 
o Steers 
o Others 
Figure 4.9: Salad Dressings 
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Own Brand 1.3 
Other 19.9 
Total ·100% 
Pre Merger HID 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 
Post Merger HHI 
Concentration Levels 
Table 4.12: Recipe Mixes 
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Pre Merger HHI 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 
Post Merger HHI 
Concentration Levels 
Table 4.13: Dry Marinades 
00/0 
1000/0 
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Manufacturer Market Share Market 
Concentration 
Levels 
Unifoods 47.8 2284.84 
Robertsons 34.4 1183.36 
Floyds 4.1 16.81 
Packo 9.5 90.25 
Other 4.2 4.2 
Total 100% 
Pre Merger HHI 3579.46 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 3288.64 
Post Merger HHI 6868.1 
Concentration Levels 





Figure 4.12: Pour-Over Sauces 
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Manufacturer Market Share Market 
Concentration 
Levels 
Unifoods 49.3 2430.49 
Robertsons 32.7 1069.29 
Tiger 16.6 275 .56 
Other 1.4 1.4 
Total 100% 
Pre Merger HHI 3776.74 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 3224.22 
Post Merger HHI 7000.96 
Concentration Levels 





Figure 4.13: Dry Pasta Sauces 
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Own Brand 3.9 
Other .7 
Total 100% 
Pre Merger HID 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 
Post Merger RHI 
Concentration Levels 
Table 4.16: Instant Soups 
89% 


















o Own Brand 
Other 
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Pre Merger HID 
Concentration Levels 
Delta 
Post Merger HID 
Concentration Levels 
Table 4.17: Black Spreads 
-1% 
100% 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The effect market definition has on market share and market concentration is made 
clear in the analysis below. 
The first 6 tables above show market share when considering the merging parties 
functional definition. Whilst cooking ingredients - flavour enhancers- and ready 
meals - instant soups - have high market shares for the merging parties, the other four 
functional market definitions show negligible market shares. The market 
concentration for UnileverlRobertsons within the functional market definitions are as 
follows: 
Cooking Ingredients - Flavour Enhancers 
Cooking Ingredients - Meal Makers 
Sauces 
Ready Meals - Family Meals 










The tables that follow consider market share using the AC Nielsen guidelines set by 
the Competition Commission. A vast increase in concentration is readily apparent. 
Packet Soup 6006.25 
Shishebo Mixes 9101.16 
Salad Dressing 4872.04 
Recipe Mixes 4382.44 
Dry Marinades 9960.04 
Pour Over Sauces 6756.84 
Dry Pasta Sauces 6740.4 
Instant Soups 7885.44 
Black Spreads 9900.25 
Average 7289.42 
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Two interesting points need to be considered: 
The Competition Tribunal sided to a greater extent with the merging parties in the 
definition of a relevant market. By the merging parties own admission their highest 
post-merger concentration of all the functional market definition lies in the Instant 
Soup market (a high concentration of7832.25) that goes a long way to explaining the 
Tribunals insistence that the Royco brand be divested. 
The impact of different market definitions is most clearly illustrated in the spread 
(functional market) vs. black spread (AC Nielsen) definition. The functional market 
definition of spreads include products such as jam and peanut butter, and have the 
effect of diluting the post UnileverlRobertson concentration to a substantially less 
significant 231 . The AC Nielsen market definition of black spreads restricts the 
market to Marmite and Bovril and creates a concentration of 9900, a true monopoly. 
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CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the great challenges facing international antitrust is the high degree of 
jurisdiction overlap that exists between merger control regimes . This is brought to the 
fore when considering the case ofUnilever Robertson, where the verdict of the 
European Commission and the Competition Commission were similar. Two factors 
which have contributed to the increase in the overlap. The first factor is clearly the 
globalisation of business. Another factor contributing to the increase in jurisdiction 
overlap between competition law systems is the increase in the number of countries 
that have adopted a competition law system. 
The scope of the pre-merger notification requirement is generally not limited to 
transactions that "substantially lessen competition" or "create or strengthen a 
dominant position". Instead most merger control regimes containing a pre-merger 
notification requirement employ surrogate data. The typical surrogate criteria is the 
sales volume of the parties involved in the transaction. Exclusive reliance on sales 
volumes expands the jurisdictional reach of the merger control regime, with 
competition regulation often being required to review transactions that have no anti-
competitive effect in their territory. The reliance on surrogate criteria to delineate the 
scope of the merger control regimes creates the potential for overlap between such 
regimes. As business increases beyond the countries actual border, and as more 
countries adopt merger control regimes, the potential for overlap increases. 
5.2 Cost of Overlapping Merger Control Jurisdiction 
Overlapping merger control jurisdiction results in significant public and private costs. 
First, the application of multiple merger control regimes to the same transaction 
imposes substantial compliance costs on the firms involved in the transaction. In each 
transaction, the firms must expend resources to determine whether a filing is required 
in each of the jurisdictions where they have assets or sales. 
Secondly, the increase in overlap between merger control regimes imposes costs on 
the regulators. In the face of shrinking budgets , regulatory efficiency has become an 
important goal in many jurisdictions. The administration and financial resources being 
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made available to the competition regulators are strained as regulators attempt to 
respond to the challenges represented by globalisation. 
Andre Fiebig in his paper - A role for the WTO in International Merger Control -
(Fiebig; 2001) suggests the need for an international competition law regime. A body, 
for example the WTO, would act as a "filter" for competitively insignificant mergers 
that would otherwise have to be notified in several jurisdictions. The international 
pre-merger office would also have jurisdiction on global mergers that are notified by 
merging parties. The primary difficulty with this concept would be to convince the 
politicians that such steps are in their national interest. Politicians and regulators are 
generally reluctant to relinquish sovereignty over competition decisions and in 
particular merger approval decisions to an independent supranational body. 
5.3 South African Perspective 
South Africa's case is somewhat unique and to a large extent justifies the need for an 
independent body. Nicola Theron identifies this difference in her statement "although 
economic criteria are important, the focus is somewhat blurred by the inclusion of 
some other ancillary objectives" (Theron; 2003). 
The South African competition Act gives a list of goals: 
Apart from efficiency and consumer choice (a) the efficiency, adaptability and 
development of the economy and (b) competitive prices and choices for consumers, 
which concerns itself with consumer welfare, other goals of competition policy are as 
follows: 
(c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans, 
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognize the role of foreign competition in the Republic 
(e) To ensure that small and medium sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity 
to participate in the economy 
(t) To promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. 
Why Do Merging Parties and Authorities Define Relevant Markets Differently? 
Page 92 
Whilst (c) to (t) may be seen by some as surrogate data, the need for these goals to be 
addressed have been backed up by the chairman of the Competition Tribunal, David 
Lewin who states "our competition act specifies a range of objectives to be served by 
competition law ... objectives like protection of SME' s promotion of employment and 
support of black owned enterprises. Some of these conflicting objectives are deeply 
embedded in the act" (Theron, 2003). 
Merging parties and authorities will always define relevant markets differently. It is 
not in their interest to do otherwise. A broader market allows for more leeway and is 
seen as the primary objective of the merging parties whilst a narrower market is seen 
by regulators as an assurance that consumers will be protected from any monopolistic 
behaviour. 
There are critics of the authorities who believe that the Commission should clearly 
articulate what principles and methodology is needs to apply when identifying and 
circumscribing a market. Professor Pier E.J Brooks, past chairman of the Competition 
Board, the governing body responsible for all mergers prior to the Competition Act 
being introduced, believes that "in order to dispel the perception among some 
businessmen that market delineation is done on an arbitrary basis, the Commission 
needs to publish a comprehensive and readily assumable exposition of the principles 
and methodologies it will apply in defining markets" (Brooks; 2003). 
The opposing argument is that defining a market is an extremely complex exercise 
and by no means an exact science. Every definition differs in relation to the context of 
the industry and in setting rules would create a formulaic way of thinking which 
would stunt the creative argument presented by merging parties and authorities. 
There is however little argument that given its limited resources, the authorities post 
the Competition Act have exceeded the vast majority of expectations. The peer review 
submitted by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Global 
Form on Competition stated that 'The competition policy bodies are recognized in 
South Africa as being notably competent and serious ... . South Africa aspires to a 
modem competition policy regime, to deal with the advanced complexities of much of 
the South African economy. Merger review in South Africa is done at a high level of 
sophistication .. . . the range of issues the Tribunal and the Commission have addressed 
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is impressive"(www.oecd.org). The most notable comment relates to the 
independence of the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal, with the 
Commission and the merging parties being equal before the Tribunal. This is clearly 
evident in the UnileverlRobertson case where the Tribunal sided towards the merging 
parties regarding the relevant market definition. 
An immediately apparent concern lies between the gap of public and private sector 
funding for the defense of cases. Large corporate' s involved in mega mergers employ 
top legal assistance expending hundreds of thousands ofRands (in some cases 
running into millions) on complex reports and "findings". The Competition 
Commission is limited to public sector funds with a staff complement of only 91 
members that include administrative and support staff Its ability to defend a case in a 
manner which is comparable to its private sector counterparts is jeapordised due to 
the strain on its resources. The use of the AC Nielsen product definitions by the 
Commission in the Unilever case could be viewed as much as a matter of convenience 
as one of practicality. With stretched resources, the Commission is limited to the 
manner in which it can counter-argue the case brought forward by the merging 
parties. 
Whilst the parties in the UnileverlRobertson case provided comprehensive studies 
relating to relevant markets using demand side substitution and concentration levels, 
the lack of focus allowed the parties to bombard the Commission with secondary 
arguments relating to supply side substitution and welfare issues: 
1. Barriers to entry 
2. Technical Barriers 
3. Access to Retailers 
4. Distribution and Merchandising 
5. Branding as a barrier to entry 
6. Rebate Schemes 
7. Countervailing power 
8. Public interest issues - employment and ability of small businesses or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons to become 
competitive. 
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If the authorities are prepared to allow a wealth of literature to guide mergers by 
defining relevant markets through demand side substitutability and evaluating 
concentration levels, it limits the scope of argument which merging parties can put 
forward when defending a case. This maximizes the limited resources of the 
Authorities as well as appeasing the needs of the private sector in providing a 
guideline within which to structure their case. 
Regardless of which recommendation is chosen, the maintaining of a three-tiered 
structure (Commission, Tribunal and Appeals Court) is imperative going forward . The 
independence of the Tribunal ensures a fair hearing for merging parties and the 
appeals court allows for recourse for disgruntled parties. 
5.4 Conclusion 
5.4.1 Expand and Strengthen the Competition Commission Workforce 
Create a specialist team whose sole purpose is to develop economic defenses to 
merger cases. The reality however is that whilst merging parties focus on one case at a 
time, the Commission has to be answerable to numerous cases concurrently. With 
public spending already strained it is unlikely that the workforce will be substantially 
increased also dispelling the likelihood that remunerations will meet those achieved in 
the private sector. 
5.4.2 Place Most Emphasis on Demand Side Substitutability and Market 
Concentration with the Use of Guidelines 
Authorities will be able to focus on the critical economic objectives. This will move 
us even more in line with first world regulators who have to a large degree identified 
demand substitutability and concentration as key to approving or rejecting a merger. 
It is hoped that ancillary objectives that have blurred those of economic importance 
will be given less weighting as democracy is firmly established both in our 
constitution and our economy. 
Whilst it is the private sector which requests for guidelines in order to provide a 
greater degree of certainty, guidelines will in fact be as beneficial to the authorities in 
leveling the playing field, focusing on the subjects seen as most critical in protecting 
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the rights of the consumer. Merging parties and authorities will always define relevant 
markets differently . A clearer view of what is required when putting forward a case 
will elevate our system to even more professional and accurate levels promoting 
efficiency adaptability and development of our competition law whilst providing the 
private sector with the certainty that it desires. 
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